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Abstract 
Simulation theory (ST) states that people understand others through simulation, which counters 
the probabilistic reasoning view of theory theory (TT). When thinking about traits of a known 
other, people use self-referential thought. It is unclear which theory—ST or TT—best describes 
the method by which self-referential thoughts occur. A combination of event-related potential 
(ERP), event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP), source localization, and hidden semi-Markov 
model multivariate pattern analysis (HSMM-MVPA) techniques are hypothesized to disentangle 
self-vs-other information processing and distinguish competing theory of mind theories during a 
trait judgment task. EEG was recorded for 45 participants (30 females) ages 18-24 (M = 19.4) on 
resting and task measures, in which participants determined whether character and appearance 
words matched characteristics of the self and a close and distant other. Data analysis included 
repeated measures MANOVAs of reaction times, amplitudes and latencies generated from the 
parietal (PCC/precuneus) P300 and latter components of the frontal (mPFC) and parietal LSW. 
Time-frequency analysis included evoked and induced power through 100 Hz. ERP data was 
localized with MNE to verify location and timing assumptions for P300 and LSW. Lastly, 
HSMM-MVPA provided an alternative look at differences in number and duration of processing 
stages. The P300/LSW and source localization showed no differences between self, mother, and 
Fallon, which did not reflect prior BOLD activations. ERP data did not have the specificity to 
detect changes amid highly variable trials. Differences in self and mother were predicted by 
induced gamma ERSP, suggesting involvement of gamma in information integration or 
categorization. HSMM-MVPA models fit TT predictions and showed significant self-other 
differences in duration of processing and magnitude of peaks. Future research should clarify the 
role of the mPFC in self-referential thought and its relation to ST and TT with simultaneous 
fMRI and EEG and populations with impaired self-recognition such as ASD and schizophrenia.
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Chapter 1: Background 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of mind is a well-studied concept stemming from philosophy of the mind during 
Descartes’ era and elaborated upon by research in developmental, personality, and social 
psychology (Clarke, 2005). A person is said to have theory of mind when they understand that 
others have differing thoughts, feelings, and motivations from their own. In the psychology 
literature, this understanding of others is classified into five developmental stages: diverse 
desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, false belief, and hidden emotions (Peterson, Wellman, 
& Liu, 2005).  
When a child has diverse desires, it means they have reached an understanding that 
people can have different desires from one’s own. Diverse beliefs are similar, but this stage 
designates the understanding that people can have differing beliefs about the same situation. 
Next is knowledge access, which is the understanding that people may be ignorant about the 
truth. Building upon knowledge access, false belief is the knowledge that someone may believe 
something different from what is true. In the final stage, hidden emotions, a child understands 
that someone may feel a certain way but look as though they feel a different way. An example of 
this is when a person smiles to look happy when they are actually sad. The developmental order 
of these stages differs according to individual differences and cultural norms, although North 
American, Australian (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005), and German (Kristen, Thoermer, 
Hofer, Aschersleben, & Sodian, 2006) children generally follow the track outlined above 
(Goswami, 2011).  
The relevance lies within the ability to distinguish actions, beliefs, and desires of oneself 
from that of others. The ability to understand other people suggests that humans have a clear-cut 
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separation of thoughts regarding ourselves versus thoughts about others. Thus, theory of mind is 
evidence for a distinction between self and other information and explains why young children 
rapidly change from a lack of understanding about others’ differing thoughts, feelings, and 
desires to having a fully developed ability to mindread. Since most people have a fully developed 
theory of mind by age five, they have developed a distinct sense of self by that stage as well.  
The two major categories of theoretical accounts for why and how people have theory of 
mind are called simulation theories and theory theories. Both have the overlapping idea that 
theory of mind is central to our social understanding.  
Simulation Theory 
The first set of theories to come about were simulation theories, in which people are said 
to understand others by predicting the other’s feelings or reactions through simulation of oneself 
as the other, by simulating the feeling or reaction as if they were the other in the situation. This is 
essentially putting oneself in another’s shoes, where neural activation is theorized to occur with 
pre-existing cognitive mechanisms for self-information processing and decision-making 
(Spaulding, 2012). With simulation theory, it is important to note that humans are not the only 
ones with theory of mind; other primates and even dogs have a rudimentary form of it. What 
makes humans unique is our cognitive ability to recognize that even though others have different 
thoughts, feelings, desires, and emotions, their experiences are comparable to our own (Mitchell, 
Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Tomasello, 1999). Thus, according to simulation theory, your imagined 
predictions of another’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors would be comparable to what you 
would experience in the same situation.  
In 2009, Frischen, Loach, and Tipper found evidence for simulation theory by showing 
that people can simulate someone else’s frame of reference (2009). They demonstrated that, in a 
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single-person goal-directed reaching task, inhibition of a distractor corresponded to the salience, 
or closeness, of the distractor to the individual. But in a two-person version of the same task, 
reaction times were longer, and the distractors that were more salient to the agent of action rather 
than the self were inhibited, suggesting a simulated frame of reference of the other. Some 
simulation theorists believe that mirror neurons are evidence of such a primitive simulation 
heuristic, since mirror neurons activate both when observing someone perform a goal-directed 
action and doing the action oneself (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Vogeley et al., 2001). Within the 
study of mirror neuron function, one of the first proposed theories was the theory of action 
understanding, which asserts that mirror neurons are the neural correlate of intention perception 
that allow us to understand others—to have empathy, a theory of mind, and a sense of morality 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
However, there is little consistent evidence that monkey mirror neurons are truly used for 
action understanding (Thompson, Bird, & Catmur, 2019), and in humans, mirror neurons are not 
necessarily required to exhibit action understanding (Hickok, 2009). One contributing factor to 
the losing debate over the theory of action understanding is defining what action understanding 
and goal-directed movement entail. A review by Thompson, Bird, and Catmur classifies studies 
of action understanding into three subcategories: action, goal, and intention identification. Their 
consolidated evidence suggests that mirror neurons are involved in action identification but not 
likely in intention or goal identification or perception (2019).  
Moreover, mirror neurons activate for more than just goal-directed actions; upwards of 
73% of them also activate for pantomimed versions of the same actions with no goal or intention 
attached (Kraskov, Dancause, Quallo, Shepherd, & Lemon, 2009) and object-free movement like 
lip smacking and tongue and lip protrusion (Ferrari et al., 2003). Additionally, majority of mirror 
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neurons activate only for specific features of an action. Some respond maximally for movement 
by the self instead of other or vice versa (Caggiano et al., 2011), left- or right-hand movement, 
according to directionality, or vicinity of an object (Caggiano, Fogassi, Rizzolatti, Their, & 
Casile, 2009). As such, mirror neurons are useful for perceiving certain features of movement 
much as visual neurons perceive features like edges and shapes. However, few if any mirror 
neurons have the capacity to generalize all features of an action performed by oneself and 
another, making intention perception unlikely (Thompson, Bird, & Catmur, 2019). As a result, 
action identification does not have the inferential qualities necessary to be the foundation of 
simulation or desire and belief understanding.  
The theory for action understanding is one interpretation of mirror neuron function, and 
under this theory, mirror neurons are physiological evidence for simulation theory. However, as 
new evidence stacks against the role of mirror neurons in action understanding, the suitability for 
mirror neurons as evidence of simulation theory is questionable. Instead of mirror neurons, 
evidence for simulation theory should come from activation characteristics of mentalizing areas 
such as the medial prefrontal cortex. Simulation theory predicts that one’s brain resources for 
self-mentalizing are also used to represent mental states of others (Goldman, 1992). Therefore, if 
regions known to activate for other-related information also activate for self-related information 
to a similar degree of magnitude and timing, then simulation of oneself as the other is a possible 
explanation for the findings. Experiments in auditory (Lima et al., 2015), visual (Kosslyn et al., 
1993; Le Bihan et al., 1993), and motor (Schwoebel, Boronat, & Coslett, 2002; Meister et al., 
2004) response have shown that imagined or simulated performance activates in regions of 
auditory, visual, or motor cortex that overlaps with overt performance with similar findings for 
socially-oriented judgments of faces and emotions (Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese, & 
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Rizzolatti, 2003; Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith, 2004; Hesslow, 2012). 
Furthermore, individual differences in the vividness of imagined states can be diagnostic of 
behavioral outcomes and overt neural specificity (Lima et al., 2015).  
The mentalizing-based method of investigation is explored in the present study with a 
cognitive model of simulation theory (Figure 1). In the presented model, the first-person mental 
state, concept of the other, and perception of contextual information drives a simulated third 
person mental state—a shifting egocentric frame (Perner, 1996). Fundamentally, the self is used 
as an analog for the understanding the other, in which the same causal structures are used for self 
and other during simulation (Apperly, 2008). From the simulated mental state representing the 
other, a decision is made, and a simulated state of having made the decision while inhibiting self 
information (Apperly, 2008; Zeng, Zhao, Zhang, Zhao, Zhao, & Lu, 2020) leads to a prediction 
of the other’s response.  
 
 




The major opposing theory in theory of mind research is theory theory, which came about 
after simulation theory by way of Gopnik and Wellman in 1994. Gopnik and Wellman theorized 
that our understanding of others’ mental states arises not from simulation but from experimental-
like learning of the social environment (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). This theory takes a more 
experiential approach than simulation theory, in which individuals use folk psychology to 
understand others’ mental states (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). A common description of theory 
theory is that children are like scientists—curious about everything and constantly experimenting 
to uncover truths about the world. Understanding other people is no exception here. The major 
difference between simulation theory and theory theory is that simulation is a first-person 
process in which the simulator draws conclusions based on how he/she would think, feel, or act. 
Theory theory, on the other hand, is a third-person process, where the individual discovers 
empirical laws that govern human interaction and uses these to draw conclusions about how 
another person would respond.  
Experiments such as one by Griffiths, Sobel, Tenenbaum, and Gopnik showed that 
children’s understanding of others improved when provided new evidence (2011). The 
incorporation of information changed the child’s conceptual framework just as theory theory 
would predict. Multiple studies have also shown that children use probabilistic reasoning; they 
combine prior knowledge and new evidence, likelihoods, and probabilities to make inferences 
(Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). 
Extending that line of reasoning to self and other inferences, children and adults incorporate 
prior knowledge and new evidence to make judgments or predictions about an other. 
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Neural activation during self- and other-related mentalizing would occur in either 
overlapping or distinct brain regions according to theory theory (Mahy, Moses, & Pfeifer, 2014), 
and both self and other would show timing and magnitude differences in the way that 
information is processed. The self would have faster processing than the other, since other-
information would require a greater degree of probabilistic reasoning about the way in which the 
other would feel, behave, or desire compared to the self, and to an increasing degree with 
unfamiliarity, similar to that seen in Moran et al. (2011). When there is too little information 
about an other, the self may be used as a prototype for other-oriented predictions, potentially 
creating an inverted U-shaped curve for timing and reasoning requirements between self, close 
others, distant others, and complete unknowns (Kuiper 1981).  
Sharing activation of precuneus/PCC and mPFC with theory of mind and self-judgment, 
autobiographical episodic memory is a potential mechanism for understanding relationships 
between experiences of the self and others in accordance with theory theory (Saxe, Moran, 
Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006; Moreau, Viallet, & Champagne-Lavau, 2013; Rosa, Budson, Deason, 
& Gutchess, 2015). Interestingly, theory of mind, self judgment, and autobiographical memory-
based tasks are interrelated to one another, emerge concurrently in development around age 3 
and a half (Saxe, et al., 2006; Perner, Kloo, & Gornik, 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2009), and all 
involve the mPFC, PCC, and precuneus (Rabin & Rosenbaum, 2012). In a subset of patients with 
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and frontal-temporal dementia, precuneus/PCC, mPFC, 
autobiographical episodic memory, and aspects of theory of mind and self-attribution are 
impaired, suggesting that these cognitive processes have shared functionality (Moreau, Viallet, & 
Champagne-Lavau, 2013). Additionally, involvement of autobiographical memory in theory of 
mind has been found to depend on familiarity, such that the reliance on shared experiences is 
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greater for close than distant others (Rabin & Rosenbaum, 2012). Personal closeness is the 
driving factor for mPFC differences between self and other rather than similarity or dissimilarity 
to the self. 
A model of theory theory is proposed with the relationship between theory of mind, self, 
and autobiographical episodic memory in mind (Figure 2). Organization of the model was 
loosely adapted from Wickens and Carswell (2006). In the proposed model, the situation or 
stimulus is first perceived and irrelevant information is filtered out by selective attention. To 
initiate the social judgment, information from the internal concept of an other is retrieved and 
indirectly references the self through memories and exemplars. When combined with folk 
psychology, known information about other and what is partially referenced through self is 
appraised through a probabilistic reasoning process that weighs decision alternatives and ends in 
an understanding of the other’s predicted response. Although developed separately, this model 
resembles the theory theory components of a computational model of theory of mind by Belkaid 
& Sabouret (2014).  
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Figure 2. Proposed model of self-referencing in theory theory, where x and y represent 
stored information about the self and other, respectively.  
 
The Self 
Like theory of mind, the self is a long-studied concept dating back to 16th century 
philosophy. One of the major points of debate for this era was the mind-body problem, in which 
researchers sought to determine whether the mind and brain are separate. The dualistic 
explanation of the mind-body problem is that the mind is the brain. Thus, developing an 
understanding of others coincides with development of relevant brain regions. As Descartes 
described throughout his works from The Rules to Meditations, our thoughts and perceptions are 
merely patterns of brain activation (Clarke, 2005). 
Descartes was also interested in the self-concept, as is partially evident by a famous quote 
attributed to his work: “cogito, ergo sum” or “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes, 1641). This 
claim came about through his own doubting—the fact that he could doubt meant he could think, 
and this meant he existed. Although very rudimentary, Descartes’ statement is an 
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acknowledgement of self. As Gallup puts it, “it is our ability to conceive of ourselves in the first 
place that makes thinking and consciousness possible” (1998). That is, having a self is evidence 
for the existence of thought and consciousness—and perhaps thought and consciousness are 
evidence of a self-concept.  
Since Descartes, Freud, Carl Rogers, and other pioneers took an interest in the topic of 
self-concept, the area developed rapidly since the 17th century, forming a modern self-concept 
theory positing that self-concepts are learned, organized, and dynamic (Purkey, 1988). Others 
have taken interest in the distinction between the self-concept and concepts of other people 
(Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Moran, Lee, & Gabrieli, 2011). 
This self-other distinction through the lens of simulation and theory theory is the motivation for 
the current study.  
Foundations of Self-Other Research 
Using neuroimaging tools, researchers have investigated the self-other distinction that 
underlies theory of mind and the philosophies of self. The research has predominantly used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Self-other judgment tasks based in fMRI often 
link self-referential thought to the dorsal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (dorsal and ventral 
mPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and precuneus, which is a similar network of 
connectivity to both theory of mind and the default mode network (Northoff et al., 2006; 
Legrand & Ruby, 2009; Yerys et al., 2015).  
The theme for many of these fMRI studies involves participants judging personality and 
appearance traits of themselves, someone emotionally connected to them, and someone familiar 
but not well known (Ochsner, et al., 2005; Heatherton et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Moran 
et al., 2011). More specifically, the participant will often be sitting alone in an fMRI machine 
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with a computer screen in front of them. On the screen, the participant will be instructed to look 
at a fixation cross. An adjective will then pop up in a designated area below or above the cross, 
and the name of the person to be judged appears on the opposite side. When the adjective 
describes the person, the participant will press a button to indicate that yes, the adjective 
describes the person. When the adjective does not describe the person, the participant presses the 
appropriate “no” button to indicate that the adjective does not match the person.  
The fMRI studies of this nature have indicated that the mPFC and regions such as the 
PCC and precuneus are activated when people make judgments about their own characteristics 
(Heatherton et al., 2006; Mitchell, Macrae, & Benaji, 2006; Moran et al., 2011; Northoff et al., 
2006). The mPFC, PCC, and precuneus are also key regions in the default mode network (DMN) 
with compiling evidence of an association between resting state and self-referential processing 
through internally directed cognition (Molnar-Szakacs, & Uddin, 2013; Leech & Sharp, 2014).  
Interestingly, the DMN and self-referential processing are abnormal in disorders like 
ASD and schizophrenia, which stem from deficits in shared functional connectivity of associated 
DMN and self-referential brain regions (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). As an 
example, a study of schizophrenia found exaggerated DMN connectivity at rest and inadequate 
modulation of shared regions during self-referential processing (van Buuren, Vink, & Kahn, 
2012). Studies in ASD have found atypical oscillatory activity in DMN, such as abnormally high 
theta, beta, gamma, and generally decreased alpha (Cornew, Roberts, Blaskey, & Edgar, 2012), 
suggesting a possible directionality of effect in individual differences of DMN activity in 
typically developing populations as well. 
With the involvement of certain brain regions in dedicated self-referential processing, it 
is likely that self-referential information is processed in a fundamentally distinct way than 
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information about others. However, sections of the mPFC, like the dorsal segment, and the PCC 
also activate for other-related thoughts (Moran et al., 2011; Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 
2012), suggesting that self and other thought may be better differentiated through differences in 
timing and network connectivity rather than activity of individual brain regions. That being said, 
the ventral mPFC may be one single-region differentiator of self and other, making it a target for 
differentiating self and other networks and for development of biomarkers for self-related 
deficits in disorders like ASD and schizophrenia (Noel, Cascio, Wallace, & Park, 2017).  
As previously mentioned, the uncertainty about the role of the mPFC, PCC, and 
precuneus in the self-concept comes from the fact that these regions also activate for other-
related judgment. In a study by Moran et al., the PCC activated for appearance judgments of the 
self and close and distant others (2011). The close and distant others in the Moran study were the 
mother and President Bush, respectively. The dorsal mPFC activated for character judgments of 
the self, mother, and Bush and the ventral mPFC activated for appearance and character 
judgments for the self (2011). Surprisingly, they also found that the ventral mPFC activated for 
character judgments of the mother—the close other—despite past research suggesting the region 
was limited to self-related thought even for intimate others (Kelley et al., 2002; Heatherton, 
Wyland, Macrae, Demos, Denny & Kelley, 2006).  
Based on behavioral survey data, Moran et al. (2011) concluded that this unanticipated 
activation of the ventral mPFC might occur because the close other’s character traits help shape 
the participant’s self-concept. From the neural data, however, it is unclear whether the ventral 
mPFC is activating for simulated self-thought during close other-character judgments or for 
indirectly referencing self by thinking about internal characteristics of someone close to us. One 
goal of the present study is to show that the ventral mPFC is a contributing part of a self-network 
13 
(Heatherton, Wyland, Macrae, Demos, Denny, & Kelley, 2006), where close-other information 
processing follows simulation theory or theory theory. 
The P300    
The P300, also called P3, is related to the mediation between perception and response, 
where the decision to categorize or classify a stimulus turns to an action (Verleger, Jaskowski, & 
Wascher, 2005). Since participants categorize character and appearance adjectives by person in 
the self-other judgment task before decision-making, there is an expected difference in P300 
amplitude for self and other categories in relation to each other, resting state, and control 
judgments. Increases in P300 amplitude have also been associated with increases in selective 
attention, meaning that larger P300 amplitudes for one category or another may be associated 
with increased attentional resources toward that stimulus and the degree to which the information 
is processed (Sur & Sinha, 2009; Sowndhararajan, Kim, Deepa, Park, & Kim, 2018). Particular 
attention is paid to self-relevant stimuli over other kinds of information, and self-relevant 
information has previously been tied to increases in P300 amplitude compared to randomly 
generated control stimuli and sporadic red words (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004) 
P300 latency is believed to correspond to classification speed (Sur & Sinha, 2009), which 
may function as an indicator of categorization differences for character and appearance words 
related to the self and familiar and unfamiliar others. In other words, the P300 latency reflects 
stimulus-processing time, which may distinguish self- versus other-relevant stimulus processing 
in timing of cognitive mechanisms. If self-related and other-related information is processed 
differently, then we should see differences in the P300 latency for self-stimuli and mother’s 
character, in addition to mother’s appearance and Fallon-stimuli. 
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The P300 component has multiple frontal and parietal generators with the largest activity 
stemming from the centroparietal sources (Knight & Scabini, 1998; Linden, 2005). True 
generators of the P300 are often modality-specific and vary by subcomponent, such as the 
modulation of PFC for P3a but not always P3b (Swick, Kutas, & Neville, 1994; Linden, 2005). 
For instance, the P3a subcomponent occurs earlier in the time window with relation to novelty 
detection or stimulus probability, as is often seen in an oddball task. With limited EEG research 
in self-other judgment tasks, it is difficult to make specific localization predictions. The best 
guess given past fMRI findings during the self-other judgment task is that the PCC and 
precuneus are neural generators of the P300, with likely mPFC activity of the P3a (Esslen, 
Metzler, Pascual-Marqui, Jancke, 2008; Subramaniam et al., 2019), reflecting cognitive 
processing of the stimuli.  
Late Slow Wave 
Late slow waves (LSWs) are <10 Hz oscillations that occur approximately 300-1000 ms 
after a stimulus, with variation according to task structure and stimulus type (Sabbagh, 2013). 
The slow wave has been tied to working memory, where a stimulus is held in memory as the 
participant makes a judgment or decision. In general, the more negative LSW amplitudes are 
associated with increased information load. In the case of self-other, an other would be expected 
to require more information to make a judgment, meaning that LSW for other would be more 
negative than for self (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004); more of an information load 
would have correspondingly longer latencies.  
Generators of LSWs have not been thoroughly researched in the case of self-other and 
may vary by cognitive task, but theory of mind studies show LSWs in frontal regions more often 
stemming from medial frontal regions (Sabbagh, 2013). With evidence of LSW differences 
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between self and other judgments (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004) and localization 
findings from theory of mind studies of understanding others (Sabbagh, 2013), differences in 
area amplitude and latency of self and other frontal LSWs are expected in the current study. 
ERSP: Evoked and Induced Power 
Although amplitudes and latencies of event-related potentials (ERPs) provide unique 
information about neural activity, there is one pitfall of ERP analysis. ERPs require data 
averaging, because of the otherwise indiscriminately small amplitudes and latencies of event-
related activity amid ongoing background activity (Makeig, 1993). Averaging cancels out 
random activity that is not time- and phase-locked to the stimulus, leaving only event-related 
neural activity with a higher signal-to-noise ratio than before. However, averaging also masks 
trial-by-trial variability in oscillatory activity, which includes important information about 
changes in frequencies over time. Across many single trials, time-frequency measures such as 
total, evoked, and induced event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP) can use variable trial 
information to construct power values in each frequency band. 
Event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP) is a measure that combines qualities of event-
related synchronization and desynchronization to give baseline deviations in log spectral power 
across time and frequency in dB (Grandchamp & Delorme, 2011). Unlike ERP, ERSP does not 
include information about data polarity. Changes in spectral power, then, must be interpreted in 
the context that multiple underlying processes could be modulating the sources of neural activity 
in the positive or negative direction (Makeig, 2004). The benefit of ERSP measures over 
standard power measures like power spectral density (PSD) is the log-transformation that limits 
the influence of outliers in even a small number of trials (Izhikevich, Gao, Peterson, Voytek, 
2018). Various self-other processing studies have demonstrated that self-relevant thought is most 
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saliently associated with evoked frontal and centroparietal alpha band power followed by frontal 
theta and gamma (Dastjerdi et al., 2011; Billeke, Zamorano, Cosmelli, & Aboitiz, 2013; 
Knyazev, 2013). 
Induced power represents the power of event-related but not phase-locked activity. This 
non-phase-locked activity is theorized to reflect top-down processes like attention, memory, and 
decision-making, unlike evoked activity that reflects bottom-up perception and processing 
(Knyazev, 2013). More complex processing beyond stimulus perception such as attention, 
memory retrieval, and decision-making underlie self and other judgments, as proposed in the 
simulation theory and theory theory models. David, Kilner, and Friston (2006) refer to evoked 
and induced power as drivers and modulators, where drivers initiate stimulus response and affect 
neuronal assemblies while modulators engage mechanisms that alter responsiveness according to 
context. David et al. (2006) description of drivers and modulators maps onto the evoked bottom-
up and induced top-down processing described by Knyazev (2013) and Mu and Han (2010).  
Mu and Han incorporated induced power into a self-other judgment task like the task 
used in the current study. They found significant differences in non-phase-locked activity in 
theta, alpha, beta, and gamma oscillatory activity between the self, other, and control conditions. 
Their study was the first of its kind to connect non-phase-locked activity with self-referential 
processing (Mu & Han, 2010) and highlighted the importance of both evoked and induced power 
measures in distinguishing self and other. Such differences include phase-locked and non-phase 
locked magnitude and timing for processing associated with specific frequency bands for 
bottom-up and top-down processes. Averaging wide ranges of variability within-subjects in top-
down processing may obscure differences by condition. Induced and evoked power highlight 
both non-phase-locked and phase-locked activity and avoid the potential obfuscation that can 
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occur when averaging trials for an ERP, although with a lower signal to noise ratio. All event-
related measures together—the ERP and phase-locked and non-phase-locked power—offer rich 
information about the oscillatory dynamics of self-other EEG.  
EEG Source Localization 
 EEG data are produced by clusters of neurons synchronous in geometry, orientation, and 
activity with local field activity summating to produce far-reaching signals that travel through 
bioelectric tissues through volume conduction and diffuse across the scalp (Makeig, 2004). By 
the time the signal reaches the scalp electrodes, there is no definitive way of knowing where in 
the brain the signals originated without simultaneous structural neuroimaging. This is the inverse 
problem. Methods have been developed to overcome the spatial hurdles of EEG, including 
algorithms that predict neural origins using the sensor data (Michel & Brunet, 2019). First, a 
forward solution is estimated from the distribution of scalp potentials brought about from 
underlying distributed source activity (Hallez et al., 2007). From the forward solution, an inverse 
solver can estimate sources of the scalp distributions (Grech et al., 2008; Song et al., 2015). 
The objective of source analysis is to use sensor information from unknown brain sources 
and sometimes a priori knowledge to localize sensor information to the neural sources. However, 
methods requiring a priori assumptions about the number of dipoles may underestimate of the 
number of sources truly underlying the signal and bias source localization to the missing dipoles 
(Michel & Brunet, 2019). Additionally, assuming too many dipoles underlie the signal may 
result in false source readings. Non-parametric distributional source localization does not require 
a priori assumptions about the number of involved dipole sources, which avoids potential 
mislocalization (Pascual-Marqui, 2002). Thus, older algorithms like classical dipole source 
localization have been replaced by less problematic distributed source localization methods, 
18 
including minimum norm estimation (MNE), LAURA, and LORETA variants (Michel & Brunet, 
2019). One of the most popular source localization methods is MNE, which is the method of 
focus (Gramfort et al., 2014; Wang et al., 1992) 
MNE is an appropriate inverse method for EEG, where signals are generated near the 
surface from post-synaptic pyramidal cells in the cortex (Wang, Williamson, & Kaufman, 1992). 
MNE yields the same source solutions with and without a priori information, highlighting the 
robustness of the method even in the absence of theoretically motivated constraints or noisy data 
with few trials (Hauk, 2004). Although additional depth weights can be added to MNE, source 
output is generally restricted to one or several surfaces, where MNE is the most accurate. As 
comes naturally with the inverse problem, there are many current distributions that can equally 
explain EEG data. To choose a source solution, MNE finds the current distribution with the 
minimum ℓ2-norm, which favors smaller and more distributed current estimates than the ℓ1-norm 
(Lin, Belliveau, Dale, & Hamalainen, 2006). By constraining source estimates from the MNE 
inverse solution to the cerebral cortex, source activity reasonably reflects the resulting primary 
current of the EEG signal.  
HSMM-MVPA 
The simulation theory and theory theory model set up is ideal for a hidden semi-Markov 
model-based multivariate pattern analysis (HSMM-MVPA) approach designed by Anderson, 
Zhang, Borst, and Walsh (2016) and validated with real and simulated datasets. Prior 
applications of the HSMM-MVPA to EEG and fMRI could effectively recover processing stages 
with strong similarity to existing an ACT-R model of associated recognition (Anderson et al., 
2016; Zhang et al., 2018). The underlying assumption of the HSMM-MVPA shared by classical 
and synchronized oscillation theory suggests that cognitive events are marked by a peak across 
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discrete brain regions caused by phasic bursts, phase resetting, or frequency band 
synchronization (Makeig et al., 2002; Shah et al., 2004; Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 
2007). Both theories share that the EEG signal is comprised of sinusoidal oscillations with 
uncorrelated background noise (Zhang, van Vugt, Borst, & Anderson, 2018).  
From the sinusoidal oscillations, the HSMM-MVPA method identifies “bumps” or peaks 
with finite duration, amplitude, and topographical distribution that represent task-specific 
processing stages (Anderson et al., 2016). The bumps begin to rise at the onset of a significant 
event, and each bump is followed by a “flat” with a mean amplitude of zero representing the end 
of a processing stage. By identifying these patterns of peaks and valleys, the HSMM-MVPA 
model can provide the number, duration, magnitude, and topography of processing stages.  
To be more specific, the MVPA identifies relevant patterns across sensors instead of 
assuming every sensor is contributing relevant information independently (Anderson et al., 
2016). The hidden semi-Markov model then simulates the system with distinct processing stages 
mapped onto every trial with initial bumps and transitions occurring for variable time intervals. 
Mathematically, the HSMM is represented by λ = (a, b, π), where a contains probabilities of a 
state transition given the current state, b is a matrix of probabilities of having a particular gamma 
distribution given a particular state, and π is the initial state distribution matrix with probabilities 
of starting in a given state (Yu, 2010). The semi portion of HSMM means that state transition 
probabilities are dependent on the amount of time elapsed since entering a state, which are 
assumed to be constant in classical HMM decision processes.   
Both HMM and HSMM address three variations of problems (Yu, 2010; Cartella, 
Lemeire, Dimiccoli, & Sahli, 2015; Kang & Zadorozhny, 2016). Given model λ, one can 
determine the likelihood that λ generated a particular sequence of observations O = {o1,…on}, 
20 
P(O | λ), or which sequence of states is optimal for producing the observed sequence. The 
expectation maximization algorithm (EM) is the final HSMM type that determines which model 
λ maximizes P(O | λ). This is the focus of Anderson et al.’s HSMM-MVPA (2016).  
With a selection of trained models, say ranging from 1-8 bumps, HSMM can determine 
which of the models most likely generated the series of observations under an optimal state 
sequence according to likelihood output as well as an estimated distribution over which state is 
occurring at time t (Cartella, Lemeire, Dimiccoli, & Sahli, 2015). Combining the estimable 
distributions and observed data, we can maximize the probabilities of having an observation 
sequence given the state sequence. By maximizing these probabilities, the model can maximize 
transition probabilities using the distribution of states. From there, with new transition and 
emission probabilities, the model can recursively estimate state probabilities until maximization 
is achieved. Figure 3 is an example of estimated probability distributions from trial 50 of the 
HSMM-MVPA self model. Likelihood output can then used to determine goodness-of-fit 
between models estimating 1-8 bumps, and leave-one-out cross validation can be used to 











      
Figure 3. Example of estimated probability distributions of maximal bump timing from trial 50 
of self. a) Probability that the peaks of processing stages are centered on a time point in a given 
trial. b) Probability that the time points fall within each of the processing stages for a given trial.  
 
This HSMM-MVPA approach bypasses the need for theory that drives standard ERP and 
time frequency approaches in EEG analysis. Rather than pre-determining time windows to 
average across or defining peaks or power bands in an unstandardized field, HSMM-MVPA 
estimates parameters that maximize the probability of having the specified signal without losing 
between-trial variability in an average. The more objective approach is less susceptible to 
researcher bias as well as more likely to find differences that may be inaccurately captured in 
researcher-specified operationalizations. 
The present experiment is an EEG adaptation of Moran et al. (2010), which found that 
character judgments of a close other (e.g., mother) are activated in a self-specific region of the 
brain. Two proposed explanations are given for the activation of mother’s character judgments in 
a self-specific region of the brain based on the theory theories and simulation theories: 1) we 
indirectly reference the self through memories or exemplars when making judgments about 
others or 2) we simulate ourselves as the other. The proposed cognitive models based on each 
a) b) 















theory differ in expected latencies and number of processing stages. Entering self, mother, and 
Fallon trials separately into the HSMM-MVPA allows for comparison between the number, 
duration, and magnitude of processing stages for each person condition. The HSMM-MVPA 
results will either map onto the simulation theory or theory theory model or will suggest an 
alternative interpretation. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of the Experiment 
Purpose 
Identifying the neural, structural, or biochemical mechanisms by which information about 
the self is treated differently from information about others may not be achievable with this 
experiment, although we progress toward that goal by evaluating results of self and other 
information obtained from two types of functional neuroimaging modalities—fMRI and EEG. 
The purpose of the experiment is multifold: to compare EEG and fMRI methodologies during a 
high-order cognitive task and provide an alternative interpretation of results that may disentangle 
the ventral mPFC’s role in self-referential versus in-group thought through ERP and time-
frequency analyses of the mid-frontal LSW.  
Research Problems 
 The first major problem is that in Moran et al.’s (2011) results, the ventral mPFC 
activates when participants make judgments about their mother’s character, when the region 
otherwise seems to be limited to self-related informational activation. Moran et al. (2011) 
attempted to explain the odd finding of ventral mPFC activation for the mother’s character by 
claiming that the ventral mPFC is a region for processing of self-relevant information, and the 
mother’s character is simply a part of the self-concept. However, the specific nature of self-
relevant activation for a close other is left unclear.  
Second, Moran et al. and other prior studies used fMRI to collect data, while this study 
utilizes EEG. There is uncertainty about EEG data having the spatial resolution necessary to 
distinguish the dorsal and ventral mPFC or precuneus and PCC. The sources are based on 
previous studies that used fMRI to gather data for self-other research (Heatherton, et al., 2006; 
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Moran et al., 2011). EEG is known to have lower spatial 
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resolution than fMRI, but fMRI has lower temporal resolution than EEG. Despite their 
differences, studies have shown that fMRI and EEG data are correlated to a relatively high 
degree, enough to reasonably expect similar data patterns. In particular, fMRI BOLD signals 
correlate strongly with EEG alpha and theta (inversely) and gamma power (positively) 
(Scheeringa, Petersson, Oostenveld, Norris, Hagoort, & Bastiaansen, 2009), which coincide with 
reasoning about social interactions (Blume, Lechinger, Guidice, Wislowska, Heib, & Schabus, 
2015), DMN (Scheeringa, Petersson, Kleinschmidt, Jensen, & Bastiaansen, 2012), and self-
referential processing (Knyazev, 2013). Low frequency oscillations like that of the LSW also 
strongly affect BOLD correlations and can influence local processing through modulation of 
gamma (Wang et al., 2012). Thus, certain lower and higher frequency bands of EEG may be 
methodologically parallel indicators of network activity seen in fMRI. In addition, a mouse study 
of oscillatory differences in dorsal and ventral mPFC showed that power levels of slow and fast 
frequencies could differentiate dorsal and ventral subregions, where dorsal regions had increased 
alpha, beta, and gamma power (Gretenkord, Rees, Whittington, Gartside, & LeBeau, 2017). 
Given two major research problems—explaining unusual ventral mPFC activation for 
mother’s character and source localizing to the ventral mPFC with EEG—general questions are 
as follows. Will adding timing data using EEG methodology help determine whether alternative 
or extended explanations are likely for the ventral mPFC’s role in self-referential thought? Will 
EEG data lead us to the same conclusions as fMRI data using the same self-other judgment task?  
Theoretical framework 
Simulation theory can be summarized as a simulation of oneself as another, while theory 
theory is based more on exploration and discovery of self-generated theories that explain the real 
world. For simulation theory, drawing conclusions about what someone else may be thinking, for 
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example, would require the observer to simulate themselves as the observed and determine what 
one would do as an other. With theory theory, the process would be more probabilistic; one 
would take all known information about the observed and determine their most probable 
thoughts, feelings, and future actions.  
Either of these theories may explain the odd findings by Moran et al. (2011). The 
research goal, in addition to replicating the original fMRI study with EEG is to use the 
replication and timing data to help determine which of these theories best applies. If ERPs are 
highly similar in shape, amplitude, and latency for the self and mother conditions, then 
simulation theory best addresses the results. If the mother waveform occurs later and with a 
significantly different magnitude than the self waveform, theory theory may provide the more 
reasonable explanation of underlying neural activity. More specifically, theory theory would 
predict that self information has an advantage in the brain, and that self information will be 
processed much faster and with more initial attentional resources and efficient processing. 
Research Objectives 
The goals of the study are to (1a) introduce novel ERP and (1b) time-frequency power 
measures to help further disentangle the physiological function of the ventral mPFC and address 
alternative explanations to Moran (2011). (2) Source analysis will determine whether 
conclusions made from P300 and LSW ERP components are spatially comparable to those made 
by fMRI data. (3) HSMM-MVPA will determine the number, timing, and duration of processing 
stages between conditions without a priori assumptions or theories.  
The research questions are the following: (1a) Will ERP and (1b) time-frequency findings 
address uncertainties about Moran et al.’s (2011) explanation for why the ventral mPFC 
activated for the mother’s character? (2) Will electroencephalography (EEG) data localize the 
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P300 and LSW with enough spatial resolution to see the differences between the dorsal and 
ventral mPFC, PCC, and precuneus seen in fMRI? (3) Without constraining the data according to 
theory, will HSMM-MVPA find differences in the number, magnitude, or duration of cognitive 
processing stages between conditions? 
According to past research, (1a) The centroparietal P300 amplitudes will be larger for 
appearance conditions, as expected from larger PCC/precuneus BOLD responses in fMRI. LSW 
is predicted to have larger amplitudes for character over appearance judgments, as expected from 
larger dorsal mPFC responses for character judgments. The ventral mPFC has activated 
specifically for the self in many studies (Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012) but also for 
close others in other studies (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Moran et al., 2011). Thus, the 
frontal P300/LSW is expected to be higher amplitude for self than other conditions, with close 
other being more similar to self than distant other. Since it is unclear whether the P300/LSW can 
distinguish between dorsal and ventral mPFC responses in magnitude, the component is 
predicted to represent a combination of dorsal and ventral mPFC activity with the largest 
amplitudes for the self-character condition, followed by self-appearance, mother-character, 
mother-appearance, Fallon-character, and Fallon-appearance. Self conditions are generally 
predicted to have a faster time course and largest amplitude in the P300/LSW time range for 
increased attentional resources and memory consolidation of self-referential information.  
(1b) Evoked and induced power (Mu & Han, 2010) will differ between self and other, 
especially in alpha, theta, gamma (Knyazev, 2013) and beta (Park, Kim, Sohn, Choi, & Kim, 
2018) frequencies according to past findings with self-referential processing in similar judgment 
tasks. Evoked alpha and theta power will be inversely related and gamma and beta will be 
positively correlated to past BOLD findings but patterns of neural oscillations will better 
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differentiate self and other across time, especially in later processing (Scheeringa, Petersson, 
Oostenveld, Norris, Hagoort, & Bastiaansen, 2009). For induced power, both low (theta, alpha) 
and high (beta, gamma) frequency neural oscillations of non-phase-locked activity will 
differentiate self and other, such that the magnitude of non-phase-locked neural activity will 
predict the degree of the self-reference over other-thought (Mu & Han, 2010).  
(3) With the addition of timing information, ERP data will differentiate the self and other 
in source localization in the neural regions of interest with better timing discriminability than 
past fMRI data. Data from source analysis will show statistically significant differences in line 
with ERP expectations such that the centroparietal P300 and LSW will localize to the 
PCC/precuneus and frontal activity to the mPFC, where each component will have significant 
differences between self and other conditions.  
(4) HSMM-MVPA predictions are as follows. In accordance with simulation theory, the 
self, mother, and Fallon models will have the same number of processing stages, will not vary in 
magnitude, and will not vary in duration of bumps. In accordance with theory theory, the self, 
mother, and Fallon models may have the same number of processing stages but will vary in 
duration and magnitude of bumps. The self will generally have faster processing stages than 
other and larger magnitude of bumps in processing through P300 latencies (300 ms) according to 
self-reference effects and potentially smaller magnitudes for self in probabilistic reasoning 




Chapter 3: Method 
Method 
 The goal of the experiment is the analysis of mid-frontal ERP amplitudes and latencies of 
the P300 and LSW, time-frequency analysis, spatial localization, and theory-independent 
HSMM-based multivariate pattern analysis to describe spatiotemporal characteristics of self-
versus-other thought. Reaction time, ERP, and time-frequency data was processed using separate 
repeated measures MANOVAs, source statistics were calculated from the Monte Carlo method 
with clustering-based correction, and optimal HSMM-MVPA models were selected using sign 
tests. All results were qualitatively compared to fMRI data from the original Moran et al. (2011) 
study. 
Participants 
 Data was collected from forty-seven college-aged adults from the University of 
Oklahoma participating for course credit. One participant (female, age = 19) had unusable data 
because of an acquisition error, and one dataset had an error during pre-processing. Forty-five 
datasets were included in analyses (15 males, age range 18-24, Mage = 19.3). Participants had to 
be at least 18 and have normal or normal-corrected vision to be included in the study. No other 
exclusion criteria were used.  
Procedures 
 Within-subjects factors were trait (character, appearance) and person conditions (self, 
close other, distant other, uppercase), where the close other was the mother and distant other was 
the politically and morally neutral celebrity, Jimmy Fallon. Dependent variables for the ERP 
analysis included area amplitudes and latencies of frontal and centroparietal electrodes for the 
P300 and LSW. For the time-frequency analysis, dependent variables were evoked and induced 
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event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP) of delta (1-4 Hz), theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8-13 Hz), 
beta (13-30 Hz), and low (30-60 Hz) and high gamma (60-100 Hz) frequencies. Reaction times 
were separately analyzed in a univariate linear model. Afterward, source localization of the P300 
and LSW ERPs and an HSMM-MVPA approach were performed.  
First, each participant’s baseline resting brain activity was measured with a 64-channel 
EGI brand (Electrical Geodesics, Eugene, OR) EEG net to account for individual differences in 
baseline activation. The baseline measurement consisted of 6 minutes of resting activity 
alternating eyes open or closed every minute. After resting data was collected, participants 
judged (‘yes’ or ‘no’) whether a series of descriptions matched characteristics of themselves, the 
close other, the distant other, and our control condition (uppercase) while whole-brain EEG data 
was gathered. Each participant was exposed to all four conditions for each of 90 character and 90 
appearance words. Altogether, there were 720 total trials, 90 each of external and internal self, 
mother, Fallon, and uppercase conditions. Internal and external refer to the word being judged; 
internal is a character trait and external is an appearance trait. Adjectives were presented for 
2000 ms on a black background below a fixation cross with the person to be judged (self, mom, 
Fallon) above the cross (Figure 4). The word display from top of the person word to bottom of 
the adjective word was 4.5 centimeters, center screen on a Dell E178FPb 17-inch LCD flat panel 
monitor with an approximate visual angle of 2.86° (distance from screen ≈ 90 cm).  
In the uppercase blocks, participants judged whether character and appearance adjectives 
were upper or lowercase. The purpose of this was to ensure that participants were not randomly 
pressing buttons while also providing additional baseline data to account for brain activation 
during button pressing and non-social decision making. The person conditions also had 
randomized upper and lowercase adjectives to ensure that the uppercase condition could be used 
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as a button-pressing baseline without confounding case differences between people and case 
conditions. 
To break down the 720 trials, there were 12 blocks of 60 trials with a jittered inter-
stimulus interval of 1000-1500 ms and a self-paced break between blocks. The self, mother, and 
Fallon conditions were randomized prior to the study within each person block, as were the 
uppercase and lowercase adjectives for the uppercase blocks. The three uppercase blocks were 
randomly dispersed between person blocks, and impedance checks occurred at the beginning of 
the experiment and repeated after every four blocks for a total of three impedance checks across 
the duration of the experiment (see Appendix A for an overview of experimental procedures).  
 
 
Figure 4. Example task stimuli. For the person and case conditions, targets (self, mom, Fallon, 
case) were above a fixation cross and traits (character or appearance words) were below. The 
fixation cross functions to minimize eye movement and, consequently, EEG artifact. 
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Data were analyzed using repeated measures general linear models (GLMs) of word 
(character, appearance) and person (self, mother, Fallon, case) conditions for reaction time and 
neuroimaging variables (P300 and LSW amplitude and latency and evoked and induced power). 
P300 and LSW amplitudes were then source localized with MNE. An HSMM-MVPA model for 
self, mother, and Fallon was developed for comparison to the proposed simulation theory (Figure 
1) and theory theory (Figure 2) models. Comparison of the EEG findings to Moran et al.’s (2011) 
fMRI findings are discussed.  
EEG Data 
After the resting and task-related EEG data was collected, files were cut into four 
sections. One contained resting data, and the others included 20 minutes of data from each of 
three blocks separated by an impedance check. Pre-processing was performed according to a 
standardized pipeline utilizing EEGlab 14.1.1 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), an open source 
toolbox for EEG analysis in Matlab (R2018b; The Mathworks, Natick, MA). Data had a 1000 Hz 
sampling rate for optimal temporal resolution of brain dynamics and were digitally filtered from 
0.5 (12dB/octave slope; zero phase) to 100 Hz (24 dB/octave slope; zero-phase) with a 60 Hz 
notch filter and re-referenced to average reference. No more than 5% of total number of sensors 
were interpolated. Afterward, the data was processed via independent component analysis (ICA) 
using EEGlab 14.1.1 and high amplitude components associated with eye movement, muscle 
movement, heart rate, and other noise were removed from the data. After pre-processing, data 
from the three blocks were merged to create a single file per subject. To reduce dimensionality of 
the data and capture task-specific activity of the dorsal and ventral mPFC, PCC, and precuneus, 
sensors were limited to corresponding frontal [2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 54, 59, 60] and 
centroparietal regions [26, 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 46], respectively (See Appendix B for 
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subsets on the electrode layout). Data was epoched from 500 ms prior to stimulus onset to 1500 
ms post-stimulus onset for ERP, time-frequency, and source analysis and baseline corrected 
using the 500 ms pre-stimulus period. Descriptive statistics and within-subjects factors are 
reported in Appendix C, Table C1 andTable C2.  
Reaction Time 
 A behavioral response such as reaction time reflects the cumulative duration of cognitive 
processing stages (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004), while ERPs provide more 
detailed information regarding latencies of early and late components of cognition. The reaction 
time data was automatically collected at button press for each EEG trial using NetStation 
continuous recording software (Electrical Geodesics, Eugene, OR), and data was pulled from 
saved .txt files into Matlab for analysis. A repeated measures ANOVA was run with reaction 
time as the dependent variable and person and word as within-subjects factors. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons based on Sidak-corrected estimated marginal means showed differences in effect 
between each level of person and word. The GLM results were compared to Moran et al.’s 
(2011) reaction time findings (see Appendix D for table output).  
ERP Analysis 
ERP data was down-filtered to 20 Hz to reduce potential high-frequency interference, 
which was of particular concern around 30 Hz where reference noise was spotted during pre-
processing. With the LSW occurring over the course of several hundred milliseconds, area under 
the curve measures were calculated with the open-source Matlab toolbox, ERPlab 7.0.0 (Lopez-
Calderon & Luck, 2014) as an indicator of amplitude as opposed to peak measures. Since there 
was an unclear onset of the LSW and offset of the P300, the P300 and LSW were combined into 
one component, henceforth called P300/LSW. Using grand averages, individual ERPs, and 
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butterfly plots for all conditions as a guide, area amplitudes were calculated with a wide window 
from 200-1000 ms (Liesefeld, 2018). 
The parietal and frontal P300/LSW were calculated separately with area amplitude using 
electrode clusters described above and shown in Appendix B. All conditions except fixation were 
measured with area amplitude, where positive and negative values were zeroed for frontal and 
centroparietal regions, respectively. Other ERPlab options for area calculation included rectified 
area and numerical integration. The ERPlab Wiki characterizes rectified area as the absolute 
value of area amplitudes, which transforms negatives into positives (see also: Luck, 2014). This 
is problematic if an ERP crosses the zero line before the cutoff—amplifying noise. The other 
option, numerical integration, subtracts negatives from positives to penalize ERPs for crossing 
the zero line sooner by shrinking the overall area value. By taking the subtraction approach, the 
difference in peak height is hidden, meaning it is unclear whether differences are due to latency 
or amplitude. Thus, zeroing was chosen as the most appropriate approach. Latencies for the 
P300/LSW were marked by the point under the curve where area is 50% on both sides using 
ERPlab (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014).  
All ERP and time-frequency variables were input as dependent variables in a multivariate 
GLM with person and word as within-subjects factors. The GLM, technically a repeated 
measures MANOVA, reduces the experiment-wise error rate compared to a series of univariate 
models, accounts for intercorrelations by creating a linear combination of the dependent 
variables (Huberty & Morris, 1989; Rencher, 2002) as well as incorporating covariance into the 
multivariate F (Garson, 2015) and having higher power (Rencher, 2002). The four multivariate 
tests (Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest Root) answer the 
broad question, “Does any of the neurophysiological data in this set of dependent variables vary 
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by person or word level after controlling for age and gender?” All four tests are reported, 
because they vary in purpose, robustness, and general methodology for testing multivariate 
effects. Pillai’s Trace is the most robust to violations of MANCOVA assumptions, but all except 
Roy’s Largest Root are generally robust (Olson, 1974; Rencher, 2002). Although Roy’s Largest 
Root is at risk of inflated type I error, it provides unique information when compared to 
Hotelling’s Trace (Olson, 1974). For instance, equal values indicate an effect driven primarily by 
a single dependent variable, a strong correlation between dependent variables, or that the effect is 
only minimally contributing to the model. 
Once multivariate tests were run, univariate tests were reviewed only for the independent 
variables found to have significant effects in the multivariate analysis. This stepwise process 
increases power compared to running multiple univariate tests with no multivariate precursor 
(Rencher, 2002). Not only does the multivariate analysis have higher power than the univariate 
version, but by taking all dependent variables as a system or linear combination reduces family-
wise error rate. As a result, first considering multivariate significance and using those p-values to 
inform univariate analysis is a method by which a researcher can include dependent variable 
inter-correlations while maintaining the ability to investigate the complex data on a more 
simplistic level with univariate and post-hoc analyses. The test of univariate within-subjects 
effects provides significance of each independent variable and interaction on each dependent 
variable. 
The multivariate and within-subjects tests answer general questions about the relationship 
between independent variables, interactions, and covariates with the set of dependent variables 
and with each outcome individually. To further elucidate differences, post-hoc comparisons 
using pairwise comparisons from Sidak-corrected marginal means are used to compare the levels 
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of person and word. A deviation or custom contrast would be another option with the added 
ability to compare more than two levels of a factor at a time. However, pairwise comparisons are 
simple and satisfactory in this case. SPSS output including F, p-values, partial eta2, and model R2 
are reported in the text with extended results in Appendix E. Parameter estimates are means of 
the dependent variables in a within-subjects design and are not included; pairwise comparisons 
of estimated marginal means show directionality. 
Time-Frequency Analysis 
Time-frequency variables were calculated using the same sensors as ERP analysis for 
evoked and induced power in the theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8-13 Hz), beta (13-30 Hz), and low (30-
60 Hz) and high (60-100 Hz) gamma frequency bands from -500 to 1500 ms. Data was notched 
at 30 Hz and 60 Hz to account for reference noise and electrical artifacts (Libenson, 2010). 
Power was calculated using the newtimef Morlet wavelet transform, with a linearly increasing 
cycle number from 1 cycle at 2 Hz to 30 cycles at 100 Hz. Total power measured via event-
related spectral perturbation (ERSP) includes both evoked and induced activity. Separating 
evoked and induced power from the total allows a distinction to be drawn between phase-locked 
and non-phase-locked activity. The judgment paradigm may induce event-locked but not phase-
locked cognitive processes such as probabilistic reasoning as the participants process properties 
of the self and other stimuli, and these processes may differ between conditions in magnitude 
and/or time course (Mu & Han, 2010; Papo, 2015). As a result, both induced and evoked power 
are included in the analyses to capture group differences in frequency band power of phase-
locked and non-phase-locked activity. To calculate induced power (non-phase-locked activity), 
the power of the baseline-corrected averaged data (evoked or phase-locking activity) is 
subtracted from the un-corrected total ERSP (evoked and induced activity), which requires a 
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power calculation on single trial data. Dependent variables for multivariate GLMs include 
evoked and induced power for frontal and centroparietal electrodes in all frequency bands.  
Evoked and induced power variables are entered into separate multivariate GLMs to 
reduce variable counts. Each multivariate GLM separately considered induced and evoked inter-
correlations among frontal and centroparietal frequency bands. Output includes multivariate 
tests, within-subject effects, and pairwise comparisons (see Appendix F for full ERSP tables).  
Source Analysis 
Source localization was performed with MNE in Fieldtrip, an open source Matlab 
toolbox (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011; Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition 
and Behaviour, Radboud University, the Netherlands. See http://fieldtriptoolbox.org) for its 
simplicity, straightforwardness, common usage, and robustness to lack of a-priori information 
(Hauk, 2004). Given the low spatial resolution of EEG and limits of localization methods, 
differential timing of the ERPs in each condition will increase the likelihood of successfully 
separating the dorsal and ventral mPFC areas with source localization over separation at a single 
time point. Localization accuracy is imperative for forming appropriate conclusions, given the 
proximity of regions of interest—dorsal and ventral mPFC, PCC and precuneus. The targets 
were P300 and LSW area amplitude measures. Since the ending of P300 overlaps the beginning 
of LSW, P300 localization included activation at 300 ms, whereas LSW localization included 
300-1000 ms activity to separate the components despite fuzzy boundaries.  
Pre-processing. Data was first loaded into Fieldtrip after pre-processing, baseline 
correction, and epoching in EEGlab 14.1.1. High-amplitude components associated with eye 
movement, muscle movement, heart rate, and other noise were removed during pre-processing to 
avoid biasing localization (Kumar & Bhuvaneswari, 2012). Once loaded, the data was down-
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filtered to 20 Hz to avoid convolution of artifact with neural signal. 0.5-20 Hz retained ERP 
peaks of interest. Afterward, the data was averaged referenced and averaged from -500 to 1500 
ms post-stimulus with a noise covariance matrix calculated from baseline.  
Forward solution. A 7 mm resolution source model was produced from a standard 3-
layer BEM head model provided by Fieldtrip after ensuring properly aligned electrodes (see 
Appendix G, Figure G1 for electrode alignment). For EEG localization accuracy, the head model 
included realistic boundaries for skull, scalp, and brain, which described a template geometry of 
the head and estimated tissue conductivity at each layer (Michel & Brunet, 2019). EEG data is 
highly sensitive to conductivity of the three layers, considering that electrical fields generated by 
neurons must pass through these surfaces to reach electrodes on the scalp. Using a head model 
that specifies levels of conductivity at each layer improves localization outcomes for EEG, 
although MNE is robust to skull conductivity errors (Matt & Olaf, 2013).  
Electrode positions were determined from standard coordinates provided by EGI. The 
template MRI from which the head model was derived came from Colin 27 data, which consists 
of 27 averaged T1-weighted scans of one individual (Holmes et al., 1998). The source model 
resolution was changed from the 1 mm default to 7 mm. The alteration reduced the number of 
dipoles inside the brain from 1,996,960 at 1 mm to 5,810 at 7 mm to improve computational load 
and remain within the recommended range of 3,000-6,000 solution points (Michel & Brunet, 
2019).  
There is a trade-off to increasing or decreasing the number of dipoles fitted for source 
estimation (Michel & Brunet, 2019). Having more dipoles significantly increases computational 
load, leads to more issues with numerical precision, and increases the risk of having spurious 
sources. Spatial resolution and accuracy are increased; however, there are diminishing returns on 
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spatial accuracy with limits set by the quantity and quality of data from the electrodes. Given that 
64-channel scalp EEG has an estimated spatial resolution of 3 cm or worse (Gevins, Le, Martin, 
Brickett, Desmond, & Reutter, 1994; Burle, Spieser, Roger, Casini, Hasbroucq, & Vidal, 2015) 
and that 3,000-6,000 dipoles are recommended, a 7 mm resolution source model with 5,810 
dipoles should be sufficient for localization. 
From the source model, electrode positions, and head model, a leadfield was computed, 
which provides forward solutions for all dipoles in a channel by source matrix (Nolte, 2003; 
Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011; Appendix G, Figure G2). The leadfield, head 
model, and ERP data was used as input into MNE source analysis, which returned a solution to 
the inverse problem in a 3D volume. All plots show activity from the cortical surface level in 
conjunction with MNE recommendations (Hauk, 2004).  
Inverse solution and plotting. For MNE, lambda was set to 3 and data was scaled to 
source covariance and pre-whitened the leadfield using noise covariance. Source output was 
grand averaged for each condition before plotting and statistical analysis. P300 was plotted at 
300 ms, and LSW was plotted in the 300-1000 ms range. Difference plots of source power were 
generated using surface plots interpolated with a sphere average and difference data computed 
using the (x1./x2)-1 operation on source grand averages. For source statistics, the non-parametric 
Monte Carlo method generated a t-map with a cluster-based correction to minimize family-wise 
error rate inflated by multiple comparisons (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007).  
Cluster-based permutation tests. The Monte Carlo method first creates a random partition 
of the data for each of two conditions and then calculates the maximum of cluster-level summed 
t-values as the observed test statistic (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007; Popov, Oostenveld, & 
Schoffelen, 2018). The cluster-based test statistics are calculated by generating two-sided t-
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values for every sample pair from the partitioned data, only keeping samples with whose t-value 
is significant at the cluster-alpha threshold (.05), clustering according to spatiotemporal 
adjacency, and setting the statistic to the maximum of cluster-level statistics taken from the sum 
of t-values within clusters (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). The steps are repeated many times to 
construct a distribution of the statistic from which random draws are used to compute the 
proportion of random partitions with a larger test statistic than the observed value. Steps were set 
to 50,000. If p is smaller than critical alpha of 0.05, then the data from the conditions are said to 
be significantly different. T-values from source statistics were plotted on the standard template 
MRI derived from Colin 27 (Figure 6-7) following procedures outlined in Appendix G, Figure 
G3. These surface t-maps were formed by interpolating the source data onto a surface mesh, in 
which there were 10,920 voxels in functional data on a [20 26 21] grid and 346,499 vertices on 
the cortical surface.   
HSMM-MVPA 
The hidden semi-Markov model-multivariate pattern analysis (HSMM-MVPA) approach 
was adapted from but closely following Matlab code provided by Anderson, Zhang, Borst, and 
Walsh associated with their 2016 publication. In their paper, they assert that processing stages of 
the same type are assumed to be the same length despite condition or subject. This means that 
variation in initial timing of the stage gives information about the response time of a subject to a 
specific condition, and the duration of the stage gives an indication of whether the subjects are 
undergoing the same types of processing in each condition. Considering the proposed models of 
ST and TT, it is possible to determine which model best applies to self-other data processing. 
Self, mother, and Fallon trials were placed into separate models to generate a self, mother, and 
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Fallon HSMM-MVPA that can be compared with respect to quantity, timing, and duration of 
stages. 
Since any data that is not time-locked is hidden by the averaged waveform, single-trial 
data was required for the HSMM-MVPA approach to identify processing stages with variable-
timing (Anderson et al., 2016). Epochs were 1 second in length, which, for most trials, cut off 
response-related processing (Appendix D, Table D1). Although 2 second epochs would ensure 
that all responses from all trials are included in the model, 2 seconds introduced a large amount 
of trial-to-trial variability in post-evoked neural data that was difficult for the HSMM-MVPA to 
filter through and gave many repetitive results. Many responses occurred in under 1.5 seconds, 
which leaves at least 0.5 seconds of unrelated neural activity to disrupt the model output. 1 
second epochs had best fitting models with 3-4 bumps, while 2 second epochs had best fitting 
models of 8-9 bumps. It is unclear whether 8-9 is an overfit or inclusion of unrelated activity that 
muddies the interpretation of output. Models with 1 second and 2 second epochs both had 
duplication of topographies, however 1 second data generally had 1 repeat while 2 second data 
showed numerous repetitions. Thus, 1 second epochs were chosen despite occasionally including 
the tail-end of response processing in a handful of trials. The trials with longer time to response 
do not appear to be condition specific. Self, mother, and Fallon have 2 conditions each (character 
and appearance). 
Hidden semi-Markov models are used to account for the timing variability of stages with 
the added benefit of being less computationally intensive as HMM-MVPA (Yu, 2010; Anderson 
et al., 2016). To reduce computational load, data was downsampled from 1000 Hz to 100 Hz, 
and a spatial PCA reduced the data to 10 components according to a scree plot, which accounted 
for 74.2, 74.6, and 74.4% of signal variance in the self, mother, and Fallon models, respectively. 
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Each component was z-scored for each trial to a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. 
Instead of having 64 electrodes, the data then consisted of 10 normed PCA components with a 
constant between-trial variability of 1. To perform the same analysis as Anderson, Zhang, Borst, 
and Walsh (2016), bumps were specified to have 50 ms in width (5 10 ms samples), which 
makes a half-sine waveform. Bumps are always followed by flats, meaning that there will be n 
bumps and n + 1 flats in the signal. By specifying a narrow width, the bumps have more 
precision in signal identification, which is advantageous for detecting processing stages of 
variable lengths.  
 Since the bottom-up approach does not require a priori information about the number of 
processing stages, the model started with neutral parameters and re-estimated until convergence 
(Anderson, et al., 2016). Initial variables included 10 ms voltages across all 64 electrodes, start 
and end samples of the trials for specific subjects and conditions, conditions and subjects by trial 
and samples, electrode descriptions, and normed PCA dimensions set up independently of the 
code provided by Anderson and colleagues. These variables were used to run various aspects of 
the HSMM-MVPA script. Log-likelihoods for N-bump models, 10*N PCA values as 
magnitudes, and (N+1)*2 gamma parameter estimates for N+1 flats were output for models with 
1 to 8 bumps.  
As the basis for the HSMM-MVPA estimation, the gamma distribution predicts the 
waiting period before an event of interest in a skewed distribution with shape and scale 
parameters (Thom, 1958). In this application, shape is fixed to 2 and scale is freely estimated by 
the HSMM-MVPA to determine stage durations (Anderson et al., 2016). Stages are assumed to 
occur discretely such that no two stages occur at the same time. Additionally, the log transform 
for likelihood turns the product of densities into a sum, which reduces computational load and 
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avoids numerical issues with machine precision (Taboga, 2017). The model with the best fit is 
the one that maximizes log-likelihood. Log-likelihood in this case reflects the likelihood of the 
bumps being centered at each time point given the gamma parameters used to estimate bump 
locations (Zhang et al., 2018).  
Because of an issue with duplicate topographies appearing in model output, several 
articles were evaluated for an explanation and solution to the inclusion of an extra, identical 
bump in output. After altering the number of PCA components to > 10 and < 10, changing bump 
durations from 50 ms to 100 ms, testing data on individual subjects, and detrending the data, it 
was clear that the duplications were not caused by overfitting, excessive noise, or temporally 
correlated noise. Adjusting code from 50 ms to 100 ms bump widths did improve output but did 
not eliminate the problem. Zhang et al. (2018) mentioned a similar phenomenon in their data, 
explained either by alpha ringing or an extra-long bump that was picked up twice or more in the 
MVPA algorithm. Their solution to constrain adjacent bumps to a maximum correlation of (T-
50/150) resolved the issue, where T is the mean durations of “flats” or time periods between 
bumps. Nearby bumps (< 200 ms) could no longer be correlated, which avoided the problem of a 
long processing stage onset pulling into separate bumps. The likely explanation is that the 
P300/LSW-like peaks in the data were longer than the 50 ms expectation, which caused a “new” 
stage to appear around bumps 3 and 4 in a 5-bump model. With the correlation correction, the 
best bump models shifted from 5 to 3-4, which is further evidence that the repeated bumps were 
not independent stages. 
Once the initial 1-8 bump models were estimated, leave-one-out cross-validation 
(LOOCV) was used to ensure that conclusions are generalizable (Anderson et al., 2016). 
LOOCV removes one subject from the dataset and uses the model to calculate the log-likelihood 
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of the missing subject’s data. This process indicated how well the model predicted data outside 
of model training. LOOCV was repeated for all 45 subjects, giving log-likelihoods for all 
individuals and all 8-bump models. The log-likelihoods were then used to determine the optimal 
model for the greatest number of individuals. The balance between generalizability and 
parsimony is important to consider in conjunction with initial fit findings. Since LOOCV fits to 
data left out of model training, the effects of overfitting are mitigated (Anderson & Fincham, 
2013; Anderson et al., 2016). In other words, log-likelihoods will not simply increase because 
there are more states or parameters in the data. A sign test was used to determine whether the 
initial N-bump model is better than the best fitting LOOCV model (Anderson et al., 2016). Sign 
tests are a non-parametric alternative to t-tests and assess the null hypothesis that the median 
difference between the 3 and 4-bump models is zero, where the 3-bump models have .5 
probability of fitting a subject’s data better than 4 bumps. Difference scores are calculated and 
used to assess the alternative hypothesis that the 4-bump model significantly improves log-
likelihoods over 3 bumps. The final, chosen model predicted the largest proportion of subject 
data without sacrificing parsimony.  
The HSMM-MVPA approach demonstrates how bumps in the signal can be localized to 
specific cognitive stages. However, identifying and classifying the number and duration of stages 
determined by the model is easiest when a cognitive architecture already exists. For Anderson et 
al., the HSMM-MVPA output was compared to an existing ACT-R model (2016). Instead of 
using a pre-existing cognitive model, the self, mother, and Fallon HSMM-MVPA were 
compared to the proposed ST and TT models to determine which theoretical framework best 
describes the data. Since the ST and TT models have not been validated, the interpretation of the 
HSMM-MVPA output will require future experiments to verify interpretation. Simulation theory 
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would assume that neural mechanisms for self would be a special case or subset of theory of 
mind functionality with similar magnitudes across self and other conditions. Otherwise, latencies 
and processing stages would not change across person. Theory theory would assume distinct 
mechanisms and latencies for processing of self and other, with potential similarity in number of 
stages but not magnitude or duration. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Behavioral results 
 Assumptions were tested prior to conducting the repeated measures (RM) ANOVA. Box 
plots showed no egregious outliers in reaction time by person or word. A Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality held for all person conditions (p > .05), but not word conditions (p < .05). Sample 
sizes are equal within person conditions (N = 90) and word conditions (N = 180), meaning that 
results will be robust to normality violation (see Table C2 for sample size breakdown). 
According to Mauchly’s test of sphericity, the sphericity assumption was violated for person (p < 
.001) but not for person*word (p = .711) with no data for word. This tests the null hypothesis 
that error covariance matrices of the orthonormal dependent variables is proportional to an 
identity matrix (IBM Corp., 2019). The Mauchly test cannot be violated for variables with only 
two levels, since it is testing for unequal covariances. For person and person*word, this test is 
highly sensitive to mild violations of normality and, combined with being low power, is not 
necessarily reliable (Garson, 2015). Regardless, to account for the violation, the conservative 
Huynh-Feldt correction was reported.  
 The 2 (character, appearance) by 4 (self, Fallon, mother, case) repeated measures 
ANOVA with Huynh-Feldt correction revealed main effects for person (F(1.60, 70.7) = 613.83, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .93), word (F(1, 44) = 59.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .57), and person*word 
(F(3, 132) = 11.31, p < .001, partial η2 = .20; Appendix D, Table D2). Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons using Sidak correction determined that all person conditions were significantly 
different from one another by at least p = .013 (Table D3). Case had the shortest reaction times 
(Table D1). Self had longer reaction times than mother but not Fallon, and Fallon had the longest 
latencies (Case < Mother < Self < Fallon). Appearance words had shorter latencies than character 
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words (character M = 1034 ± 17 ms; appearance M = 1000 ± 15 ms). Pairwise comparisons of 
person within each level of word and word within person were tested using a Sidak-corrected 
pairwise comparison of estimated marginal means to elaborate on person and word differences 
masked in the overall person*word interaction (Table D4). The Case < Mother < Self < Fallon 
pattern held for all but the comparison between self and Fallon for appearance words, which did 
not reach significance (p = .137). Last of all, case did not significantly differ by word condition 
(p = .855; Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean reaction times by person and word condition.  
 
ERP Amplitudes and Latencies 
Spearman’s rho correlations showed moderate correlations < 0.9 between dependent 









account (Appendix E, Table E1Error! Reference source not found.). For the assumption of 
univariate normality, Shapiro-Wilk showed a violation for all word conditions (p < .001) on all 
ERP variables except centroparietal latency (p > .330). Person conditions violated normality for 
all but Fallon in frontal latency (p = .066) and self, mother, Fallon, and case in centroparietal 
latency (p = .969, p = .323, p = .240, p = .986). Since sample sizes are equal within person and 
within word, results are robust to normality violation. Mauchly’s test of sphericity showed that 
the sphericity assumption was violated for person across all ERP variables (p < .002) and for 
person*word across frontal latency (p = .026). Therefore, at least one inter-correlation is non-
zero and the conservative Huynh-Feldt corrected results were reported for the test of within-
subjects effects. In the face of sphericity violations, a repeated measures (RM) MANOVA is 
recommended over multiple univariate RM-ANOVAs and warrants a multivariate approach for 
this data (Garson, 2015).  
MANOVA output provides 4 multivariate tests to determine whether the independent 
variables have a significant effect on the system of dependent variables. Pillai’s Trace takes the 
sum of effect sizes for the discriminant function and is highly robust when assumptions are not 
met (Olson, 1974; Rench, 2002; Grice & Iwasaki, 2007). Thus, Pillai’s Trace is the primary test 
reported here. Multivariate output revealed that at least one ERP variable differed by person 
(F(12, 393) = 5.59, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace = .438, partial η2 = .146) and word (F(4, 41) = 5.11, p 
= .002, Pillai’s Trace = .333, partial η2 = .333) but not person*word (F(12, 393) = 1.43, p = .151, 
Pillai’s Trace = .125, partial η2 = .042; Table E2). According to raw discriminant function 
coefficients of the multivariate output, the best standardized weighted combination of ERP 
variables to discriminate person is frontal area (-.817) + frontal latency (1.12) + centroparietal 
area (.017) + centroparietal latency (-.631) and for person*word is frontal area (.268) + frontal 
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latency (-.302) + centroparietal area (-.907) + centroparietal latency (-.266). No multicollinearity 
was found for area or latency that would bias discriminant function results (VIF ≤ 3.053 for all 
variables; Poulsen & French, 2004). This means that the optimal difference between person 
conditions would show low frontal and nearly zero centroparietal area, faster frontal latencies, 
and slower centroparietal latencies with the greatest differentiation by frontal area and latency, as 
would be expected from ventral mPFC BOLD findings. For person-word conditions, the optimal 
difference would show high frontal area, low centroparietal area, and shorter latencies and is 
likely drawing from differences in self, mother, and Fallon to case, which has shorter latencies, 
more positive frontal, and less positive centroparietal area.  
Although univariate output is automatically provided by SPSS for multivariate GLMs, 
the univariate aspect of analyzing multivariate output is not required (Grice & Iwasaki, 2007) but 
will be briefly reviewed. The univariate within-subjects test with Huynh-Feldt correction showed 
significant differences by person for frontal area (F(2.43, 107.08) = 7.89, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.152), frontal latency (F(1.53, 67.11) = 5.55, p = .011, partial η2 = .112) and centroparietal area 
(F(2.23, 98.24) = 6.16, p = .002, partial η2 = .123). Significant differences by word included 
frontal and centroparietal latency (F(1, 44) = 12.91, p = .001, partial η2 = .227; (F(1, 44) = 13.36, 
p = .001, partial η2 = .233; Table E3).  
Person*word had a significant difference for centroparietal area in the univariate but not 
multivariate model (univariate F(2.79, 122.89) = 4.02, p = .011, partial η2 = .084; Table E3). The 
most likely explanation is that frontal and centroparietal areas are highly and significantly 
correlated, which is incorporated into the multivariate but not univariate analysis (Spearman’s 
rho = .801, p < .001; Appendix E, Table E2). In summary, person*word no longer significantly 
contributed in the context of other dependent variables, namely frontal area, but had univariate 
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influence on centroparietal area. A correlation of .801 is potentially too high for the MANOVA, 
with the variables essentially being treated as a singularity during linear combination. The 
recommendation for dependent variables is a “moderate” correlation with vague and varying 
guidelines about what that entails. Researchers Grice and Iwasaki suggest that correlations up to 
.90 are acceptable for multivariate analyses (2007). Because of the potential for a biased 
multivariate outcome for person*word, the effect on centroparietal area was explored with this 
paragraph as a disclaimer.   
Piecing apart the specific dependent variables that differ by person, word, and 
person*word, post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that mother (MMother-Case = .239 µV; p = 
.014), and Fallon (MFallon-Case = .281 µV; p = .002) conditions had significantly larger frontal ERP 
areas than case, and self trended in the same direction (MSelf-Case = .189 µV; p = .078) (Table E4). 
For frontal latency, self again trended (MSelf-Case = -43.60 ms; p = .055) in the direction of 
mother, where latencies were shorter for mother than case likely due to the smaller amplitude 
and wider width of the case ERP (Mmother-Case = -45.55 ms; p = .049). Centroparietal area showed 
significant differences by case for mother (MMother-Case = .240 µV; p = .025) and Fallon (MFallon-
Case = .251 µV; p = .009) with near-trend-level differences for self (MSelf-Case = .217 µV; p = .101). 
Areas were generally larger for person (self, mother, Fallon) than case. For word conditions, 
character significantly differed from appearance in frontal and centroparietal latency such that 
character words had shorter 50% area latencies (frontal MCharacter-Appearance = -18.81 ms, p = .001; 
centroparietal MCharacter-Appearance = -20.57 ms; p = .001; Table E5). 
Looking exclusively at centroparietal area, pairwise comparisons of person*word showed 
that differences from case were greater for appearance judgments of mother (MMother-Case = .360 
µV; p = .004), and Fallon (MFallon-Case = .309 µV; p = .008) than character judgments (MMother-Case 
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= .120 µV; p = .088; Fallon (MFallon-Case = .194 µV; p = .089) with a trend in the opposite 
direction for self (p = .081; Table E6). Again, this is only a univariate effect. According to 
pairwise comparisons, no differences between self, mother, and Fallon were significant among 
ERP variables.  
Induced and Evoked Power 
During assumptions testing, spearman’s rho correlations between dependent variables 
showed correlations < .90 for all induced and evoked variables. Induced low and high 
centroparietal gamma had the largest correlation followed by induced centroparietal delta and 
theta (Spearmans rho = .891; Spearman’s rho = .887; Appendix F, Table F1). Both centroparietal 
gamma variables are retained, however it is possible that a split between low and high gamma 
frequencies is unnecessary. Sphericity is less of an issue for multivariate analyses, but the 
assumption was tested out of transparency. Mauchly’s test revealed a violation of the sphericity 
assumption for all induced power variables by person (p < .004) except for frontal theta, alpha, 
beta, and centroparietal alpha (p > .097). For evoked power variables, sphericity was only 
violated for frontal delta (p = .032) and centroparietal delta (p < .001) and beta (p = .014). 
Sphericity held all of person*word (induced: p > 110; evoked: p > .056). With the presence of 
sphericity violation, all univariate results are reported with the Huynh-Feldt correction.  
Induced Power. All four multivariate tests for induced power were significant by p < .001 
for person (F(36, 369) = 2.48, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace = .584, partial η2 = .195) and person*word 
(F(36, 369) = 1.47, p = .045, Pillai’s Trace = .375, partial η2 = .125) but not word (F(12, 33) = 
.818, p = .631, Pillai’s Trace = .229, partial η2 = .229; Table F2). This suggests that at least one 
dependent variable varies across levels of the independent variable person and the interaction 
between person and word conditions. Expanding upon the multivariate within-person test results, 
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univariate tests show significant effects of person on frontal and centroparietal delta (pf = .033, 
partial η2 =.074; pcp < .001, partial η
2 = .159), low gamma (pf = .010, partial η
2 =.097; pcp < .001, 
partial η2 =.185) and high gamma (pf = .013, partial η
2 =.096; pcp < .001, partial η
2 =.233). The 
interaction showed significant differential effects of different levels of person*word on frontal 
high gamma (p = .005, partial η2 = .092; Table F3).  
One pattern for person-level effects included self, mother, and Fallon having greater low 
and high centroparietal gamma than case with an additional significance in delta frequencies for 
self and Fallon but not mother. Additionally, mother had less centroparietal and frontal delta and 
frontal low and high gamma than Fallon but only differed from self in low gamma. Therefore, 
low frontal gamma implied a pattern of Mother < Fallon = Self (Table F4). 
Post-hoc person*word comparisons are summarized in the table below (Table 1 and more 
extensively displayed in Appendix F, Table F5). General patterns showed that significant 
differences were limited to delta and both ranges of gamma (30–60 Hz and 60–100 Hz). 
Mother’s character only differed significantly by self character such that self responses had 
higher gamma power than mother responses. Self and mother had less high frontal gamma and 
centroparietal delta than Fallon for appearance, and self alone had less frontal delta than Fallon. 
Mother had consistently lower power than Fallon in frontal delta and low gamma with marginal 
significance for character and full significance for appearance. All conditions varied from case 
such that case had greater centroparietal delta for character and less centroparietal gamma for 
character and appearance, primarily in high gamma. 
The discriminant function coefficients suggested an optimal linear combination of 
induced variables for person*word, with standardized coefficients fDelta(-.280) + fTheta(.180) + 
fAlpha(.157) + fBeta (-.173) + fGammaL(.056) + fGammaH(-.912) + cDelta (-.017) + cTheta (-
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.061) + cAlpha(-.009) + cBeta(-.413) + cGammaL(-.343) + cGammaH(.458). Data showed 
potential multicollinearity for all induced power variables except frontal and centroparietal delta, 
which means there may not be a unique discriminant solution with inclusion of all variables and 
variables may be poorly estimated (VIFdelta ≤ 8.338 and 11.803 ≤ VIFall ≤ 18.155; Poulsen & 
French, 2001). With that caveat in mind, weights may suggest that low frontal theta and 
centroparietal delta and gamma best separates self, mother, Fallon, and case. Again, the 
combination is most likely driven by differences in case from self, mother, and Fallon. 
Interestingly but in line with pairwise results, the gammas seem to contribute more to the 
person*word differences than other frequencies with opposite sign in frontal and centroparietal 
regions.  
Table 1. Induced power patterns of significance 
Induced Power Character Appearance 
 Frontal Centroparietal Frontal Centroparietal 
Self = Mother < Fallon   *High γ *δ 
Self > Mother  Low γ    
 *High γ    
Self < Fallon   δ  
Mother < Fallon δ  *δ  
 Low γ  *Low γ  
Fallon > Case   Low γ *δ 
   *High γ β 
Self = Mother > Case  *Low γ   
Self = Mother = Fallon < Case  *δ   
Self = Mother = Fallon > Case  *High γ  *Low γ 
    *High γ 
Sidak corrected, includes marginally significant (p < .10) and significant (p < .05) differences 
with p < .05 denoted by *. δ = delta, β = beta, low γ = low gamma, high γ = high gamma. 
 
 
Evoked Power. Multivariate output revealed significant differences for person (F(36, 369) 
= 1.51, p = .034, Pillai’s Trace = .385, partial η2 = .128) but not word (F(12, 33) = .556, p = .861, 
Pillai’s Trace = .168, partial η2 = .168) or person*word (F(36, 369) = 1.31, p = .113, Pillai’s 
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Trace = .341, partial η2 = .114; Table F2). Since at least one dependent variable varies at levels 
of person, univariate within-subjects tests were investigated.  
Using a Huynh-Feldt correction, univariate analyses revealed a significant difference for 
centroparietal delta (p = .010, partial η2 = .091). No other significant univariate differences were 
found for person, but there were marginally significant findings for frontal delta (p = .058, partial 
η2 = .057), theta (p = .096, partial η2 = .047), and low gamma (p = .081, partial η2 = .050; Table 
F3).  
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed more specifically that mother had more frontal 
delta (p = .016), centroparietal delta (p = .010), and marginally higher frontal low gamma (p = 
.053) than Fallon. No significant differences were found for self or case (Table F4). 
Discriminant function coefficients suggested that evoked power best discriminates person 
by fDelta(.039) + fTheta(.073) + fAlpha(.430) + fBeta (.308) + fGammaL(.239) + 
fGammaH(.233) + cDelta (.651) + cTheta (-.915) + cAlpha(.426) + cBeta(-.790) + cGammaL(-
.223) + cGammaH(-.035). Tests of multicollinearity indicated no violation (VIF ≤ 3.845). 
Centroparietal theta, beta, and frontal and centroparietal alpha had the largest contribution to 
differences in person*word, which is informative considering that theta, alpha, and beta were 
found to differentiate self and other in EEG studies by Mu and Han (2010) and Park et al. (2018).   
Source Localization 
In source space, the cluster-based permutation test revealed significant (α = .05) two-
tailed differences at 300 ms, the P300 latency, and 300-1000 ms, the LSW range, between the 
following conditions: Fallon and case character (P300 only), case character and appearance, self 
and case appearance, mother and case appearance, and Fallon and case appearance (p < .025 on 
each tail). Raising alpha to .10 for a significance level of .05 at the tails revealed an additional 
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difference between Fallon character and appearance LSW and new trend-level source activity in 
the aforementioned pairings. T-maps are plotted in Figure 6 and Figure 7 without masking for 
significance; significant regions were darkened using an overlay of images masked by p < .025 
and marked with an asterisk. Image layering was done in GIMP 2.10.0 x64 for Windows. Since 
atlases cannot be used in conjunction with surface plots in Fieldtrip, conclusions about region-
specific variation among conditions are cautiously considered. Sample statistics were chosen for 
clustering when less than critical alpha = .05. Every pairwise comparison had clusters, but few 




           
Figure 6. Plots of t-values in positive and negative clusters using Fieldtrip’s ft_sourcestatistics 
with cluster-based permutation. The frontal lobe points downwards. Significant differences are 
denoted with an asterisk and a black overlay from images masked by p < .025, which were 










Figure 7. Unmasked t-maps for self, mother, Fallon, case, with character-appearance activity. 
Case P300 and LSW was significantly different between character and case in the positive t 
direction denoted with an asterisk and darkened overlay. Fallon had a marginally significant (p < 




 Initial HSMM-MVPA log-likelihoods were highest for the 3-bump self and mother 
model and the 4 bump Fallon model. LOOCV showed optimal fit for the 4-bump Fallon model 
for 16 subjects and the 3-bump self and mother model for 12 and 23 subjects over all 1-8 bump 
alternatives (Figure 8). Log-likelihoods were similar for 3 and 4 bumps in each condition, 
therefore a sign test determined whether the 3 or 4 bump model had the best proportion of fit by 
subject for each person condition. For the MVPA application, the value change of the sign test 
determined whether a larger number of bumps was a logical choice over a more parsimonious 
model. The smallest positive or negative value was used for the test statistic to determine the 
probability of finding a value equally or more extreme. According to results for self and mother, 
3 bumps had larger log-likelihoods than 4 bumps for 30 (p = .018) and 33 subjects (p = .001) out 




not reach significance (p = .068). The sign test suggested that self, mother, and Fallon data did 
not have significant log-likelihood improvement with 4 bumps; the data is best explained by a 3-
bump model.
 
Figure 8. Mean log-likelihood gain of self, mother, and Fallon models using LOOCV 
 
Duration of Stages. Using a repeated measures ANOVA with post-hoc comparisons, 
Fallon significantly differed from self and mother in mean duration of stages 1, 2, and 4 using 
times from character and appearance and all stages, subjects, and electrodes (Person*Stage F(6, 
264) = 160.92, p < .001, partial η2 = .785; Appendix H, Table H1; Figure 10). Self and mother 
had longer character and appearance latencies than Fallon for stage 1 (p < .001) during pre-
cortical processing and shorter latencies thereafter (p’s < .022). For stage 3, around the P300 
latency, Fallon significantly differed from mother but not self such that character and appearance 
latencies were shorter for mother (p < .047). Additionally, self differed from mother in stages 2 
and 3 for character but not at all for appearance.  
Mother Fallon Self 
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Figure 9. Bump topographies and stage durations for the 3-bump self, mother, and Fallon 
models collapsed across character and appearance.  
 
 
Figure 10. Mean duration of stages for 3-bump models of self, mother, and Fallon  
 
Magnitude of Peaks. Using bump magnitudes averaged across the 10 PCA components, 
differences between person (self, mother, Fallon) and bump were assessed with a repeated 
measures Sidak-corrected ANOVA. Within-subjects effects of person, bump, and person*bump 












































combinations of self, mother, and Fallon differed in bump magnitudes across all three bumps (p 
< .001; see Appendix H, Table H2). Estimated marginal means of self were significantly greater 
for mother and Fallon for bumps 1 and 2 and smaller for 3. Mother generally had smaller 
magnitudes than self but greater magnitudes than Fallon for bumps 1, 2, and 3. Fallon had the 
smallest bumps for 1 and 2 and the largest for 3. Bumps 1 and 2 suggested a Fallon < mother < 
self pattern of magnitudes, while bump 3 indicated self < mother < Fallon.  
Electrode-Specific Activity. Using a single electrode from frontal and parietal areas (FZ 
and PZ, respectively) revealed that self and mother had more similar EEG activity than Fallon at 
FZ given the large positive frontal spike for Fallon around 150 ms (Figure 11). The first bump 
for parietal self around 250 ms broke a pattern from the others as well, but no test was used for 
statistical comparison.  
 
 
Figure 11. Character and appearance data for self, mother, and Fallon from frontal electrode FZ 
and parietal electrode PZ after adjusting to the average maximized likelihood bump locations 















Chapter 5: Discussion 
Mother judgments had faster RTs than self, Fallon judgments 
Compared to Moran et al. (2011), behavioral results show the same main effects for word 
and person and person*word interaction. Consistent with past findings, appearance words had 
shorter latencies than character words and the reaction time for distant other (Bush before, Fallon 
now) was significantly different from the close other (mother), where Fallon > mother. Moran et 
al. (2011) also found a difference between Bush and self (Bush > self), which held true for the 
current data (Fallon > self). Unlike Moran et al., there was an additional difference between self 
and mother such that mother had shorter latencies for character (Mself = 1146.03 ms; Mmother = 
1120.25 ms) and appearance (Mself = 1099.50 ms; Mmother = 1080.06 ms) words than self, 
although Moran’s et al.’s data trended in the same direction (Mself,char = 1305.15 ms, Mself,appear = 
1267.24 ms; Mmother,char = 1299.51 ms, Mmother,appear = 1259.01 ms; 2011). Case was not present in 
the original study, but the significant difference between case and all other person conditions 
(self, Fallon, mother) was expected. Inclusion of the case condition thwarts concerns that person 
effects are simply due to differences in word length or concreteness between appearance and 
character words (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Moran et al., 2011).  
ERP results in the next section address determine whether differences in reaction time are 
due to variation in processing in the 300-1000ms window. Interpretation concerning simulation 
and theory theory are discussed. 
ERPs Did Not Distinguish Person Conditions beyond Case 
Results showed that self had smaller frontal area than both mother and Fallon and an 
overall mean closest to the case condition. Additionally, mother and Fallon significantly differed 
from case with mother having a more similar mean to case than Fallon. Taken together, the 
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means of frontal area suggested a case < self < mother < Fallon pattern. The same pattern of 
means applied to centroparietal area, where case < self < mother < Fallon. However, self did not 
reach significance in the self-case comparisons, unlike mother-case and Fallon-case (Appendix 
E, Table E4).  
For latencies, significance was only found in the frontal region for mother-case, with a 
trend for frontal self-case, suggesting that behavioral reaction time differences across person 
conditions were not due to timing of frontal or centroparietal activity. In summary, case ERPs 
had smaller area amplitudes than self, mother, and Fallon, which was expected (Figure 12). Both 
frontal and centroparietal regions had a trend of area means that suggested case < self < mother < 
Fallon, although significance was not reached for self-case, self-mother, self-Fallon, or mother-
Fallon comparisons.  
For word, character and appearance had an interesting dynamic, where character 
judgements had shorter latencies than appearance judgments in frontal and centroparietal regions 
(Table E5). It is likely that the narrower shape of the character ERP pulled the 50% area line 
earlier in time than the wider appearance ERP. This points to greater trial-by-trial variation in 
response to appearance judgments than character judgments. In other words, character judgments 
were more difficult overall—judging by their longer reaction times—but were more consistent in 
the degree of difficulty per judgment. Some appearance judgments were likely very 
straightforward (e.g., is Fallon brown-eyed?), while others were more challenging (e.g., is Fallon 
drab?). It is also possible but less likely that shifts in latency for character and appearance 
occurred outside of the specified regions or later in time post-LSW. 
Although initial glances at the ERP results seem to suggest a simulation interpretation 
given the non-significance between self, mother, and Fallon in latency and area, it is important to 
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address other possibilities. The first issue is that area amplitude and area latency measures as 
defined may not have the specificity to pick up on group differences found in previous studies, 
which include differences in BOLD activity between self, mother, and Fallon. Variations that 
may exist are obscured by taking the overall area and disregarding other aspects of ERP shape. 
Additionally, it is possible that the largest group differences occur in the tail through 1500 ms 
(Figure 12). The pitfall of extending the range that wide is that it may capture unwanted activity 
beyond the LSW.  
 
Figure 12. Frontal and centroparietal ERPs by person and word condition. Zero marks stimulus 
onset. Fixation is included for comparison of inter-stimulus activity with a visual cue to activity 
during the judgment task. 
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Beyond issues with ERP operationalization, an alternative explanation to the findings is 
that there were simply few, if any, real significant differences by person and word condition in 
the dataset. Past studies suggest otherwise (Heatherton, Wyland, Macrae, Demos, Denny & 
Kelley, 2006; Mitchell, Neil, & Mahzarin, 2006; Moran et al., 2011), although this particular 
sample of college-aged individuals may be an exception. Box plots did show outliers in the data, 
which are known to skew results of multivariate GLMs (Peña & Prieto, 2001). However, the 
outliers were not extreme enough to warrant removing and potentially ignoring real and 
important individual differences in cognitive processing and associated effects on neural activity.  
Lastly, like power data, ERP variables were corrected for multiple comparisons using 
Sidak corrections, which are less conservative than Bonferonni corrections but still very 
conservative when tests are not independent (Abdi, 2007). The correction may be too penalizing 
for the EEG data, considering that tests are within-subjects and multivariate. A correction such as 
the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure may be a more reasonable approach to correct false 
discovery rate over the more traditional Bonferonni or Sidak-based corrections, where p-values 
less than the critical value (i/m)Q with i as rank, m as number of tests, and Q as false discovery 
rate (McDonald, 2014). As a final check to determine whether differences may exist in different 
electrode subsets, a multiplot figure was created to view grand average ERPs for each condition 
(person*word) across all 64 channels (Appendix E, Figure E1-Figure E2). After thorough 
investigation, differences in reaction time cannot be explained by timing or degree of cognitive 
processing between person conditions using ERP data. 
Since ERPs were not significantly different by person aside from the control condition, 
ERP results appear to follow simulation theory over theory theory. This suggests that all person 
conditions are undergoing the processing steps through identical neural structures on similar 
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timescales. However, this also suggests that case, self, mother, and Fallon judgments had similar 
ERP area amplitudes and latencies in the frontal and centroparietal regions that showed group 
differences with fMRI. Overall BOLD concentrations differed by person condition across entire 
trials and in more precisely defined regions than EEG, while the electroencephalographic activity 
did not reliably differ across time. Information from frequency data, source space, and 
multivariate pattern analysis must be evaluated to determine whether simulation theory is 
plausible and consistent with all avenues of analysis in the study. In short, other avenues do not 
suggest simulation.  
Instead, the lack of findings between self, mother, and Fallon and inconsistency with 
fMRI findings suggest a large degree of variability across trials and individuals. High variation is 
problematic for the ERP approach. By taking averages across epochs, differences between trials 
are masked in wideset ERPs that limit detection of change by condition. Essentially, there was 
too much trial-to-trial and person-to-person variability for ERPs to be effective at identifying 
significant differences across conditions to the same degree as fMRI BOLD concentrations. A 
technique that relies on single-trial data and preserves between trial variation such as HSMM-
MVPA is more suitable for this trait judgment task and for other EEG tasks requiring higher-
order cognitive processing with a variable timescale. 
Induced and Evoked Power in Delta, Gamma Differentiated Person Conditions 
 Induced power. With regard to induced power, self, mother, and Fallon had significantly 
higher centroparietal delta power than case in character responses as well as less centroparietal 
gamma for character and appearance. Low frequency non-phase-locked oscillations such as delta 
arise from coherent activity between populations of neurons with an essential role in global 
processing and integration across neural regions (Mu & Han, 2010; Knyazev, 2012). Data 
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supports a related integration account, in which the self-relevance of information is evaluated by 
a subregion of the mPFC, which is functionally connected to and communicating with task-
relevant regions like the PCC/precuneus (Cooper, Bassett, & Falk, 2017).  
Higher frequencies such as gamma, on the other hand, correspond to optimization and 
global processing on a shorter timescale, allowing for a dynamic system of fast and slow 
oscillations constraining one another to coordinate activity across regions for required task 
processing. Delta modulates gamma in the hierarchy and has an essential function for slower, 
more complex computation such as required by character judgments or with increased memory 
load (Knyazev, 2012). Additionally, delta is associated with the P300 component, which 
suggests that delta activity may be related to attention, memory, and complex integration of 
information. The increase in centroparietal delta and corresponding decrease in centroparietal 
gamma comparing case to self, mother, and Fallon suggests that both frequency bands are part of 
a modulatory system for integrating social information that is absent or lessened in basic word 
processing. Frontal delta, high gamma, and centroparietal low and high gamma were chosen by 
the discriminant function. This suggests that these dependent variables maximally contribute to 
person distinctions. 
Beyond case, self had enhanced induced power over mother in gamma bands (30-60 Hz 
and 60-100 Hz), in agreement with Mu and Han (2010). Self and mother both had less frontal 
high gamma and centroparietal delta than Fallon for appearance, which may suggest that Fallon 
appearance required a larger degree of information integration or complex processing than self 
and mother, considering that there is less information about Fallon on which to judge. In general, 
self and mother required less delta and gamma than Fallon for appearance and marginally for 
character judgment, but with self having higher gamma than mother for character judgments. 
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Researchers have proposed a developmental advantage of having an earlier recognition of 
mother over self which may explain the strong overlaps between mother and self concepts 
(Damon & Hart, 1982; Knyazev, 2013). Perhaps the concept of mother is a robust, relatively 
unchanging mental model, while the concept of self is ever-changing and, therefore, more 
complex to judge.  
Evoked power. Mother was shown to have more frontal and centroparietal delta power 
than Fallon. Neither self or case differed from mother or Fallon in any evoked frequency bands. 
Considering that evoked power is more often related to stimulus processing (Knyazev, 2013), 
mother may have required more initial processing than Fallon. Although not used in the 
univariate or post-hoc comparisons, the discriminant function coefficients reflected past findings; 
frontal alpha and centroparietal delta, theta, alpha, and beta had the highest weights in the linear 
combination. Each of these frequency bands was expected to significantly distinguish self and 
other. This was not the case for significance, but the weights suggest an inherent importance of 
these frequencies, primarily in centroparietal theta. For instance, theta is tied to memory such 
that self has enhanced encoding and retrieval of episodic memory and an increase in memory 
load compared to self-irrelevant information (Doppelmayr, Klimesch, Schwaiger, Stadler, & 
Rohm, 1999). Although self did not differ from other in evoked power, the relative importance of 
theta and memory in differentiating person conditions in the centroparietal region is highlighted.   
Summary. Overall, there were 12 induced and 12 evoked power variables (frontal and 
centroparietal; delta to high gamma) with several significant pairwise differences between person 
and word groups (see Appendix F, Figure F1 for induced and evoked power by person, word, 
and region; Table F4 and Table F5 for comparison tables). Ideally, the case condition would 
narrow down the most relevant relationships; if each person condition (self, mother, Fallon) 
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significantly differed from case, then differences between people would more likely be due to 
cognitive processing of person rather than spurious or person-irrelevant differences among 
groups. Consistent differences from case occurred for induced power of centroparietal delta for 
character judgments and centroparietal gamma for character and appearance judgments. No 
differences from case were found for evoked power. Timing of power provided a single new 
insight into the self character and mother character differentiation; self had higher induced 
gamma power than mother.   
Source Differences Did Not Reliably Differ Between Self, Mother, and Fallon  
Because of unknowns with localization accuracy and multiple comparisons, despite 
corrections, it is not appropriate to claim that a specific region significantly differs from group A 
to group B using cluster-based permutation (Hauk, 2004). The inverse problem suggests that 
there are infinite localization solutions, and although MNE is an inverse solver, the true 
underlying source activity may not be accurately captured. Therefore, results are described 
according to overall significant differences between groups and trends of difference in certain 
broad source regions. 
Character-Appearance. Character activity had more nuanced differences than appearance 
across person conditions. In general, self, mother, and Fallon showed appearance differences 
from case, but only Fallon showed differences from case with character judgments. It is likely 
that the ERP data underlying the source activity does not have enough power to separate self and 
mother from case. That is, Fallon is differing from case more than self and mother but does not 
clarify whether self and mother have the same magnitude of activity. Additionally, case and 
Fallon are the only conditions to have differences across character and appearance. Case showed 
differences for P300 in the right centroparietal region, where character had increased source 
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activity opposite of the character-appearance findings for self, mother, and Bush in Moran et al. 
(2011). For LSW, case showed differences around the left temporal lobe, while the Fallon LSW 
trended toward less source activity in the right temporo-parietal region for character compared to 
appearance, as expected from prior BOLD findings. 
Case. Generally, case had less source power than the other conditions judging by the 
source plots of t-values (Figure 6). Significant differences were primarily in appearance, where 
all person-responses (self, mother, and Fallon) differed from case, and only Fallon differed in 
character. Self character judgments appeared to have less activity in the centroparietal region for 
the LSW than case, although no overall differences were identified between self and case 
character at the cluster-level.  
Examining source movies that show source power across time, positive frontal activity 
was very low in source power compared to other regions and often appeared in short bursts. 
Since source localization was computed on EEG data with known limitations in source 
resolution, it is possible that dorsal and ventral mPFC activity requires greater source power 
resolution to capture self and other differences. One reason that EEG in particular is limited in 
this sense is that the electrical signal underlying EEG is distorted as it passes through tissues to 
the electrode. Even with source localization of the EEG data, activity from the ventral and dorsal 
mPFC measured at the scalp surface could easily be overshadowed or misinterpreted after 
smearing. To take advantage of the superior timing of EEG with the required source specificity 
of fMRI, a simultaneous EEG-fMRI recording may be required to capture the intricacies of self-
other differences in a judgment task.  
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HSMM-MVPA Distinguished Self and Other by Stage Durations and Bump Magnitudes 
For the final phase of analysis, a sign test between 3- and 4-bump HSMM-MVPA models 
chose an optimal 3 bumps for self, mother, and Fallon conditions. Testing for timing and 
magnitude differences between the three models revealed significant differences between self, 
mother, and Fallon that were not found in other analyses of this data. Given differences between 
self, mother, and Fallon in timing and magnitude, the results are interpreted in terms of the 
proposed theory theory model (Figure 2).  
Duration of stages. Self and mother differed from Fallon, such that self and mother had 
later character and appearance latencies than Fallon for stage 1 (Mself,character = 248 ms; 
Mself,appearance = 255 ms; Mmother,character = 256 ms; Mmother,appearance = 261 ms; MFallon,character = 148 
ms; MFallon,appearance = 149 ms), which coincides with what was seen between mother and Fallon in 
evoked delta power. Considering that Fallon has a nearly 100 ms difference from self and mother 
in stage 1 and a very different topographical distribution, the Fallon model is likely selecting an 
entirely different processing stage than self and mother. Since stage 1 represents the time for the 
signal to reach the brain and undergo pre-cortical processing (Anderson et al., 2016), the Fallon 
model is likely picking up a visual N1-like sensory processing stage around 150 ms, while self 
and mother models are first picking up a P200 or P300-like stage beginning around 250 ms.  
Although the stage 2 window for self and mother could correspond to either a P200 or 
P300-like peak, the specific nature of the stage is unknown. Both P200 and P300 have been tied 
to selective attention to stimulus features, information categorization, and sensitivity to self-
referencing or self-relevance (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Polich, 2007; Yu, Tu, 
Wang, & Qiu, 2010). The components are similar in theorized function, but the P200 is thought 
to reflect pre-perceptual processing, whereas the P300 reflects post-perceptual processing with 
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strong ties to both attention and working memory load (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 
2004; Wongupparaj, Sumich, Wickens, Kumari, & Morris, 2018).  
With the function of P200 and P300 in mind, it is possible that as attention and self-
relevance increase, the P200-like bump is augmented. In the case of self and mother information, 
attention and self-relevance would lead to a much larger peak for self and mother than for Fallon. 
It is possible that the modulation of the peak may be overshadowing the importance of an earlier 
stimulus processing bump for self and mother. For Fallon, the P200-like bump would be 
dampened by the degree of self-relevance lacking for a distant other, according to theory theory. 
In such a case, the Fallon model would have a small peak that may be overshadowed by stimulus 
processing peaks and explain the differences between the Fallon model and self, mother models. 
Therefore, stage 2 of the self and mother models may be described as an attention allocation or 
information categorization stage for which self had later latencies than mother. For Fallon, stage 
2 is classified as early stimulus processing for the N1-like topography and latency. 
When allowing a 4-bump model, self, mother, and Fallon topographies become more 
consistent (Figure 13). The first bump for self and mother models shifts to a topography and 
latency resembling the visual N1, introducing a standalone stimulus processing stage for self and 
mother. This would suggest that in a 3-bump model, the N1-like bump representing early 
stimulus processing is more salient than memory retrieval or probabilistic reasoning for the 
Fallon model, while the P200 or P300-like bump is more representative for self and mother. 
Additionally, all models gain a bump around 500 ms with 4 bumps, splitting stage 3 into stages 3 
and 4. If the 4-bump model were accepted, the additional bump would suggest that the theory 
theory model is missing a stage. The probabilistic reasoning stage may be best described by 






Figure 13. Topographies of self, mother, and Fallon for 3 and 4-bump HSMM-MVPA models. 
See Appendix H, Figure H2 for the 5-bump model topographies. The 3, 4, and 5-bump models 
have considerable similarity to the topoplots in Figure H1. 
 
Beyond early sensory processing, self and mother had shorter latencies than Fallon for 
information retrieval (mother-Fallon only) and probabilistic reasoning stages by character and 
appearance, corresponding to time ranges 450-750 ms and 750-1000 ms, respectively. 
Information retrieval was best described by the pattern mother < self < Fallon, where mother 
differed from self and Fallon but self and Fallon did not differ from one another. The retrieval 
3-Bump Model 
4-Bump Model 
Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 3 Stage 4 










stage may reflect LSW processing, which has been associated with episodic memory and 
extended working memory processes (Gray et al., 2004; Voss & Paller, 2017). Self also had later 
character latencies than mother for stages 2 and 3, which correspond to attention and 
categorization-based processing and memory retrieval stages around 250-450 ms for stage 2 and 
450-750 ms for stage 3.  
Differences in character response between self and mother but not Fallon could be 
explained by not having enough information about Fallon to make a reasonable probabilistic 
judgment. Consistent with theory theory, autobiographical memory may be engaged during 
judgment of mother but not Fallon or it may be engaged to a lesser degree for Fallon. This 
follows Rabin and Rosenbaum’s study, in which they found evidence of self-referential activity 
in the mPFC during a mentalizing task of a personally close but not distant other (2012). In 
distant other situations, it is possible that self is used as a prototype or exemplar but processed in 
a probabilistic fashion (Kuiper, 1981; Karylowski, Konarzewski, & Motes, 2000). Essentially, in 
line with reaction time data, there is a U-shaped curve for using self as prototype in distant-other 
judgment. However, instead of faster reactions for self, the fastest reactions were for mother. By 
using self as a prototype or other schema in general, Fallon judgments are based less in 
autobiographical memory as self and personally close others and more on semantic and 
schematic memory that would explain differences between self and mother vs. Fallon (Oschner 
et al., 2005). 
 
Character    Appearance 
Stage 1 Fallon < Self = Mother Stage 1 Fallon < Self = Mother 
Stage 2 Mother < Self < Fallon Stage 2 Mother = Self < Fallon 
Stage 3 Mother < Self < Fallon  Stage 3 Mother = Self < Fallon 
Stage 4 Self = Mother < Fallon  Stage 4 Mother = Self < Fallon 
73 
Magnitudes of Peaks. Bump magnitudes were averaged across all 10 PCA components 
and compared across person (self, mother, Fallon) and bump, collapsed across character and 
appearance. The within-subjects results showed that person, bump, and person*bump all had 
significant differences. All pairwise comparisons of self, mother, and Fallon at bumps 1, 2, and 3 
were significant. Bumps 1 (information gathering and early processing) and 2 (memory retrieval) 
had a pattern of Fallon < mother < self, while bump 3 (probabilistic reasoning) indicated self < 
mother < Fallon as hypothesized.  
 
In summary, differences in timing and magnitude for Fallon may be rooted in a greater 
reliance on semantic and schematic memory as opposed to autobiographical memory for 
personally close others and self (Rabin & Rosenbaum, 2012). For an unfamiliar other with little 
to no shared information with self, schema and common knowledge, or folk psychology are 
central to understanding. Having more shared experiences or episodic memories with a more 
familiar other will drive mentalizing about that other more so than semantic or schematic 
memory.  
Given the number of stages and differences between self and other that were identified in 
the HSMM-MVPA approach, it is apparent that the theory theory model is more fitting for the 
data than the simulation model (Figure 1; Figure 2). For bump 3, approximately in the 
probabilistic reasoning stage of the theory theory model, self, mother, and Fallon significantly 
differed in peak magnitudes in the hypothesized pattern of ventral mPFC character activation: 
Self < Mother < Fallon. Durations of stage 4 associated with bump 3 also differed such that 
character showed a Self = Mother < Fallon pattern and appearance showed Mother = Self < 
Bump 1 Fallon < Mother < Self 
Bump 2 Fallon < Mother < Self 
Bump 3 Self < Mother < Fallon 
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Fallon. The fluctuations of timing and magnitude across bumps and stages may explain why 
mother had faster reaction times than self, as well as how influential time windows are on the 
ability to distinguish self and mother latencies or activations. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
  Source Localization with Low-Density Nets. Several limitations and assumptions were 
encountered in this research and should be carefully considered. For example, the number of 
electrodes and quality of data both influence source localization. Although the optimal 128- and 
256-channel EEG nets give higher spatial resolution and more accurate localization solutions 
than lower density nets, data from 64-channels have the advantage of demanding less memory 
and computational power from an already computationally intensive process. Compared to 
clinical nets that are often <32 channels, 64-channel nets also provide a reasonable compromise 
between precision and time. However, the 64-channel net available for this study had an unequal 
distribution of electrodes across the scalp surface, which partially violates best practice via 
inadequate spatial sampling and thus may have distorted source solutions. Slight variations in 
electrode positions from subject to subject could also contribute to the problem as well as 
differences in scalp thickness and geometry, which could only be modeled with individual MRI 
head models (Song et al., 2015).  
 Data quality is always important when artifact has potential to overshadow or bias results. 
To improve the quality of solutions, data must be thoroughly pre-processed, including 
appropriate filtering, referencing, resampling, ICA, and artifact removal. Data in this study was 
cleaned with both automatic and manual artifact detection and ICA labeling using a standardized 
Matlab pipeline, which ensures a large degree of consistency and thoroughness of pre-processing 
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between datasets (see EEG Analysis). However, 30 Hz noise was prevalent in the dataset, and 
although filtered out with a 30 and 60 Hz notch filter, may have left remnants of noise. 
 Lack of sensitivity. There are clear limitations in source analysis with using a template 
head model and MRI from Fieldtrip rather than individualized scans. Additionally, source 
analysis can be very computationally demanding, and the source model was restricted to a 7 mm 
source grid to reduce load. EEG data may have poor source accuracy, but the more data 
simplification, the more likely the source output will be less representative of reality (Cohen & 
Cuffin, 1991; Liu, Dale, & Belliveau, 2002).  
Defining Time Windows. In traditional ERP and time-frequency approaches, there are 
limitations for knowing when a person is thinking about themselves or others during the 
character-appearance judgment task. Thus, the accuracy of traditional EEG approaches hinges on 
having appropriate time windows for capturing self- or other-related thoughts. Judgments may 
occur outside a window that is too narrow, but wide windows may bias results toward unrelated 
neural activity. However, individual differences in timing of late cognitive processes like P300 
and LSW vary as cognitive events unfold, and subject-specific peaks are ill-defined. Therefore, 
ERP, time-frequency, and source analysis relied on grand averages to determine the optimal time 
window for minimizing extraneous data and maximizing the likelihood of capturing the P300 
and LSW in every individual. A plot of superimposed individual ERPs verified that no subjects 
have ERPs occurring outside of the grand average time window.  
With the HSMM-MVPA approach, subjective and theory-driven issues like defining time 
windows are surpassed. Instead of relying on theory, the HSMM-MVPA algorithm used pre-
processed EEG data to find bumps that mark new stages of cognitive processing while 
minimizing potential researcher bias. 
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Information Processing. One critique of trait judgment tasks is that self, mother, and 
Fallon information could be processed differently simply because trait judgments of Fallon have 
not occurred before, requiring more or different reasoning and decision formulation than mother 
and self information. As a result, a future study should level the differences by requiring 
judgments about the self, a familiar, and an unfamiliar other in scenarios that have not been 
directly observed and cannot be easily predicted. In such a case, one cannot rely entirely on 
memories of oneself or another person to make judgments or predictions in a given situation. 
Moral dilemmas are an example of such scenarios, since it is impossible to know how someone, 
including oneself, would respond in situations they have never been in. 
Conclusion 
Although several measures were ineffective at distinguishing person or word conditions 
as expected, the present study addressed alternative explanations to Moran’s finding that the 
ventral mPFC is activated for the mother’s character in addition to self (2011). (1a) the P300 and 
LSW amplitudes did not match BOLD findings. The frontal and centroparietal P300/LSW did 
not show larger amplitudes for character over appearance and did not differ between self, 
mother, and Fallon in amplitude or latency. However, differences from case in frontal and 
centroparietal area amplitude suggested a case < self < mother < Fallon trend. The ERP data 
alone was not enough to suggest one theory of mind theory over another given methodological 
concerns, data trends, and mismatched EEG to fMRI findings. 
(1b) Frequency band power has been highly correlated with BOLD responses, which 
implies that BOLD and EEG frequency band power should be similar and that differences 
between self and other may be explained by changes in frequency band power and timing of the 
EEG. In induced or non-phase-locked power, significant differences occurred primarily in delta 
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and low and high gamma, such that self had higher frontal gamma power than mother responses, 
self and mother had less frontal high gamma and centroparietal delta than Fallon in appearance, 
and self additionally had less frontal delta than Fallon. Although delta was not reported in past 
studies, gamma has been commonly found to be a differentiator of self and other (Mu & Han, 
2010; Dastjerdi et al., 2011; Knyazev, 2013). These findings do not necessarily rule out 
simulation theory but do suggest that self, mother, and Fallon processing is differing, perhaps in 
integration or complex processing of information. 
(2) P300 and LSW amplitudes did not reliably differentiate the self and other in source 
localization in the PCC, precuneus, and dorsal and ventral mPFC. The idea that timing 
discriminability would benefit source localization was impeded by the fact that P300 and LSW 
could not be easily differentiated in time. A time bin approach would solve this problem. T-maps 
of the source data did show significant differences between self, mother, and Fallon P3 and LSW 
and case in appearance. Further source specificity would require changes to the EEG set-up, 
study design, or use of a supercomputer. The self-other distinction is so nuanced in source space 
and probably sensor space that EEG generally may not be viable for the study of self-other 
thought in healthy populations. Neurocognitive disorders like autism spectrum disorder and 
schizophrenia have been associated with impaired self-recognition and may show more distinct 
differences between self and other than typically developing individuals in areas tied to 
impairment (Hobson & Meyer, 2005; Lyons & Fitzgerald, 2013). The ability to use EEG 
separate from fMRI and attain accurate but low-resolution source localization would be a cost-
effective solution for labs with existing EEG setups or lower budgets to study intact and 
impaired self-referential thought. It is unlikely but possible that an upgrade to a 128 or 256-
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channel net may be all that is needed to achieve self-other differences seen in prior research and 
in the HSMM-MVPA method described below. 
(3) The HSMM-MVPA model independently selected 3-bump models for processing 
self, mother, and Fallon judgments during the self-other trait judgment task. Timing and 
magnitude findings of the self, mother, and Fallon HSMM-MVPA models fit with the theory 
theory model of mentalizing. Theory theory predicts that self information would be processed 
faster and with more initial attentional resources, in line with findings for the early processing 
and information gathering stages of processing. Theory theory would also predict that self would 
have less probabilistic reasoning load than other-based processing related to the degree of 
information available to reason about the self and other, which varies as a function of familiarity 
and indeed matches findings for the probabilistic reasoning stage of the model.  
Topographies of the bumps were reasonably linked to topoplots of ERP data across time 
(Figure H1). Three distinct patterns appear in the topoplots that are associated with early 
stimulus processing, information gathering and memory retrieval, and probabilistic reasoning as 
chosen by the 3-bump self, mother, and Fallon HSMM-MVPA models with slight topographical 
variation between self, mother, and Fallon models. This final phase of EEG analysis was 
successful at identifying reliable self-other differences in both time and magnitude, with the 
added benefit of remaining objective. If mentalizing about others occurs through the probabilistic 
reasoning process following theory theory, then the odd activation of mother’s character in 
Moran et al. (2011) can be explained by indirect self-referencing through episodic memory 
retrieval.  
Although the decision to settle on simulation or probabilistic reasoning was not obvious 
across ERP, time-frequency, source analysis, and MVPA methods, the data does suggest that 
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simulation is not a likely explanation. Across all socio-cognitive processing, it is most probable 
that both simulation and theory theory are used in some capacity or combination for specific 
tasks. For example, the trait judgment task used in this study likely initiated direct judgments of 
self and other based on episodic and schematic knowledge as opposed to reflective judgments 
drawn from beliefs about how others may perceive us. These first and third person reflections are 
thought to stem from different underlying processes but with shared activation of the mPFC and 
PCC/precuneus (Oschner et al., 2005). Simulation may be more likely to occur in the reflective 
judgment, where judgments are based more on imaginative situations like, “If I were someone 
else, would I think I was kind?” Addressing that possibility is beyond the scope of this data. 
Additionally, a proposed combination simulation-theory-theory perspective suggested 
that implicit simulation could be a default, fast model of understanding others, while folk 
psychology provides slower but more complex understanding when there is information about 
others to work from (Gallagher, 2007). If that were so, distant other judgments would have 
shorter reaction and processing times, which was not the case. 
Future Research. Since participants were healthy and conditions were highly similar, 
varying only in person and word type, neural differences were small but biologically relevant. To 
ensure that there is enough power to assess these minute changes with respect to condition, 
measures must be precise in time, robust to noise, and otherwise properly defined. Using 
traditional EEG analyses, data could be re-analyzed with a more focused subset of electrodes 
around the medial prefrontal cortex and PCC/precuneus to address concerns over capturing 
nearby but irrelevant activity in an overly spread electrode subset. Even without data smearing 
that happens as pyramidal cell activity travels to the scalp, the selection of electrodes has a great 
influence on what is defined as frontal activity. The subset chosen here may be misrepresenting 
80 
the dorsal and ventral mPFC or PCC/precuneus. Although a single frontal subset was chosen, as 
opposed to separate dorsal and ventral selection, the P300 and LSW were hypothesized to 
distinguish ventral and dorsal according to their neural generators and differences in timing. 
Because the P300 and LSW were indistinguishable in the waveform, the ability to then 
distinguish areas of the mPFC using that approach was severely limited.  
The most ideal solution for addressing both source and timing aspects of self and other 
differences would be simultaneous EEG and fMRI or a more suitable EEG setup for localization 
such as higher density nets and precise electrode positions. Having a 128-channel or higher 
density net would allow for a more selective and precise grouping of electrodes with EEG, and a 
greater benefit from fitting a larger number of dipoles (Michel & Brunet, 2019). Without 
collecting new data, the dataset could be investigated as a time series with 10 ms bins of activity 
across averaged and single trials. Since the original hypotheses involved a curiosity about timing 
differences between self and other, the time bins may be better suited to address timing changes 
across the ERP and better able to separate contributions of the P300 and LSW without specifying 
onset and offset in large time windows.  
Differences may also be more apparent in self or other-relevant trials, where the subject 
answered “yes” that the trait adjective describes the person, as evidenced by (Mu and Han, 
2010). Future research could consider the neurophysiological effects of relevance on self-other 
responses taking familiarity into account. Additionally, the task itself could be adapted into a 
more traditional theory of mind task, in which participants make judgments regarding an other’s 
expected mental state or predicted response in a scenario. These adjustments would address any 
concerns over the word judgment task being an oversimplification or limited aspect of 
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mentalizing in theory of mind. For instance, considering only direct, first-person judgments of 
self and other and not reflective, third-person judgments. 
Neurological Disorders. Having a more comprehensive understanding of the dorsal and 
ventral mPFC better in a healthy population is an important stepping-stone for understanding 
abnormalities in these regions associated with self or theory of mind deficits in ASD or 
schizophrenia such as trouble referencing self when understanding others (Sass and parnas, 
2003; Veluw & Chance, 2014). As an example application, ASD involves deficits in 
autobiographical episodic but not semantic memory that could potentially determine whether 
unfamiliar others are being differentially judged with semantic as opposed to episodic memory 
and to what degree that differs for personally familiar others compared to self (Lind & Bowler, 
2009). On the contrary, if the degree of semantic and episodic memory contribution in a typically 
developing population was known for self-other judgment across familiarity, then it would be 
possible to determine whether individuals with ASD use compensatory processes for impaired 
episodic memory that may explain difficulty but not complete absence of ability to distinguish 
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Appendix A: Timetable of Task Design 
Table A1. Timetable of Task Design 
Task Information Method 
Approximate 
Length of Time 
Informed Consent Paper 3 minutes 
Demographic Questionnaire Paper 2 minutes 
EEG Net Application Person 5 minutes 
Impedance Check Person 5 minutes 
Resting EEG Computer 10 minutes 
Blocks 1-4 Computer 15 minutes 
Impedance Check Person 5 minutes 
Blocks 4-8 Computer 15 minutes 
Impedance Check Person 5 minutes 
Blocks 8-12 Computer 15 minutes 
EEG Net Removal Person 5 minutes 
Debriefing Form Paper 5 minutes 




Appendix B: 64-Channel Montage and Electrode Selection 
 





Appendix C: Descriptive statistics and breakdown of within-subjects factors 
Table C1. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age 360 17 24 19.33 1.384 
Gender 360 0 1 .67 .472 
fArea 360 .02 4.05 1.07 .76 
fLatency 360 271.31 949.33 511.37 82.27 
cArea 360 .04 4.49 1.27 .82 
cLatency 360 275.70 779.30 526.04 79.67 
Inducedf_delta 360 52.79 68.31 60.94 3.01 
Inducedf_theta 360 48.80 65.82 59.05 3.44 
Inducedf_alpha 360 46.84 67.89 56.73 3.76 
Inducedf_beta 360 42.49 58.22 50.33 3.05 
Inducedf_lowgamma 360 38.77 49.78 44.30 2.48 
Inducedf_highgamma 360 35.72 48.66 42.64 2.59 
Inducedc_delta 360 -6.32 -.46 -2.41 1.04 
Inducedc_theta 360 -8.48 -1.28 -4.40 1.53 
Inducedc_alpha 360 -11.29 -1.06 -4.54 1.91 
Inducedc_beta 360 -7.97 -1.15 -2.86 .91 
Inducedc_lowgamma 360 -3.86 -1.31 -2.24 .38 
Inducedc_highgamma 360 -3.27 -1.50 -2.20 .29 
Evokedf_delta 360 48.59 68.46 61.05 3.23 
Evokedf_theta 360 43.50 67.83 58.84 4.15 
Evokedf_alpha 360 40.44 72.24 57.31 4.67 
Evokedf_beta 360 37.64 60.44 50.15 3.28 
Evokedf_lowgamma 360 34.57 49.75 43.70 2.40 
Evokedf_highgamma 360 34.19 47.65 42.24 2.62 
Evokedc_delta 360 -8.28 -.57 -2.49 1.25 
Evokedc_theta 360 -10.42 -1.16 -4.25 1.88 
Evokedc_alpha 360 -11.24 -.42 -4.35 2.14 
Evokedc_beta 360 -6.87 -1.37 -2.87 .92 
Evokedc_lowgamma 360 -3.92 -1.34 -2.25 .38 
Evokedc_highgamma 360 -3.62 -1.56 -2.23 .32 







Table C2. Within-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Group 0 Character Self 45 
1 Character Fallon 45 
2 Character Mother 45 
3 Character Case 45 
4  Appearance Self 45 
5  Appearance Fallon 45 
6 Appearance Mother 45 
7 Appearance Case 45 
Person 0 Self 90 
1 Fallon 90 
2 Mother 90 
3 Case 90 
Word 0 Character 180 




Appendix D: Reaction Time Output 
Table D1. Mean reaction times by person and word condition 
 Self Mother Fallon Case 
Character 1146.03(16) 1120.25(16) 1173.75(17) 697.43(15) 
Appearance 1099.50(15) 1080.06(15) 1122.02(15) 696.73(14) 




Table D2. Tests of within-subjects effects for reaction time 
Source Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. Partial η2 
Person 12382189.39 1.60 7708133.58 613.828 .000 .933 
Error  887572.01 70.68 12557.49    
Word 108917.54 1.00 108917.54 59.160 .000 .573 
Error 81006.48 44.00 1841.06    
Person*Word 36352.00 3.00 12117.33 11.311 .000 .204 
Error 141410.55 132.00 1071.29    















Table D3. Post-hoc pairwise person and word comparisons for reaction time 
 
(I) Person (J) Person 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.b 
95% CI for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Self Mother 22.610* 5.950 .003 6.218 39.001 
Fallon -25.119* 7.742 .013 -46.445 -3.792 
Case 425.684* 15.485 .000 383.029 468.340 
Mother Self -22.610* 5.950 .003 -39.001 -6.218 
Fallon -47.728* 7.484 .000 -68.344 -27.112 
Case 403.075* 14.816 .000 362.261 443.888 
Fallon Self 25.119* 7.742 .013 3.792 46.445 
Mother 47.728* 7.484 .000 27.112 68.344 
Case 450.803* 16.908 .000 404.228 497.378 
Case Self -425.684* 15.485 .000 -468.340 -383.029 
Mother -403.075* 14.816 .000 -443.888 -362.261 
Fallon -450.803* 16.908 .000 -497.378 -404.228 
(I) Word (J) Word    
 
  
Character Appearance 34.788* 4.523 .000 25.673 43.903 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 








Table D4. Post-hoc pairwise person*word comparisons for reaction time 
Word (I) Person (J) Person 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.b 
95% CI for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Character Self Mother 25.781* 7.994 .014 3.761 47.802 
Fallon -27.719* 9.011 .021 -52.540 -2.898 
Case 448.596* 17.744 .000 399.716 497.476 
Mother Self -25.781* 7.994 .014 -47.802 -3.761 
Fallon -53.501* 10.446 .000 -82.275 -24.726 
Case 422.815* 16.579 .000 377.145 468.484 
Fallon Self 27.719* 9.011 .021 2.898 52.540 
Mother 53.501* 10.446 .000 24.726 82.275 
Case 476.315* 19.091 .000 423.728 528.903 
Case Self -448.596* 17.744 .000 -497.476 -399.716 
Mother -422.815* 16.579 .000 -468.484 -377.145 
Fallon -476.315* 19.091 .000 -528.903 -423.728 
Appearance Self Mother 19.438* 6.842 .040 .591 38.284 
Fallon -22.518 9.646 .137 -49.088 4.052 
Case 402.772* 14.328 .000 363.303 442.241 
Mother Self -19.438* 6.842 .040 -38.284 -.591 
Fallon -41.956* 7.781 .000 -63.389 -20.522 
Case 383.335* 14.537 .000 343.290 423.379 
Fallon Self 22.518 9.646 .137 -4.052 49.088 
Mother 41.956* 7.781 .000 20.522 63.389 
Case 425.290* 15.917 .000 381.445 469.136 
Case Self -402.772* 14.328 .000 -442.241 -363.303 
Mother -383.335* 14.537 .000 -423.379 -343.290 
Fallon -425.290* 15.917 .000 -469.136 -381.445 
Person (I) Word (J) Word    
 
  
Self Character Appearance 46.529* 8.800 .000 28.794 64.265 
Mother Character Appearance 40.186* 7.807 .000 24.452 55.919 
Fallon Character Appearance 51.731* 8.454 .000 34.693 68.768 
Case Character Appearance .706 3.847 .855 -7.048 8.460 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 








Appendix E: ERP Output 
Table E1. Spearman Correlations between ERP DVs 
 fArea fLatency cArea cLatency 
Spearman's rho fArea 1.000 .205** .801** .214** 
fLatency .205** 1.000 .145** .502** 
cArea .801** .145** 1.000 .227** 
cLatency .214* .502** .227** 1.000 
*. Correlation significance at .05 level 








Table E2. Multivariate within-subjects effects for ERP amplitude and latency 
Within Subjects Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η2 
Person 
 
Pillai's Trace .438 5.592 12.000 393.000 .000 .146 
Wilks' Lambda .569 6.758 12.000 341.593 .000 .171 
Hotelling's Trace .745 7.930 12.000 383.000 .000 .199 
Roy's Largest Root .729 23.885 4.000 131.000 .000 .422 
Word 
 
Pillai's Trace .333 5.113 4.000 41.000 .002 .333 
Wilks' Lambda .667 5.113 4.000 41.000 .002 .333 
Hotelling's Trace .499 5.113 4.000 41.000 .002 .333 
Roy's Largest Root .499 5.113 4.000 41.000 .002 .333 
Person * Word 
 
Pillai's Trace .125 1.426 12.000 393.000 .151 .042 
Wilks' Lambda .877 1.444 12.000 341.593 .144 .043 
Hotelling's Trace .137 1.457 12.000 383.000 .138 .044 
Roy's Largest Root .112 3.657 4.000 131.000 .007 .100 
Design: Intercept  
Within Subjects Design: Person + Word + Person * Word 








Table E3. Univariate tests of within-subjects effects for ERP amplitude and latency 
Source Measure Type III SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. Partial η2 
Person fArea 4.159 2.434 1.709 7.887 .000 .152 
fLatency 125443.921 1.525 82241.174 5.552 .011 .112 
cArea 3.823 2.233 1.712 6.161 .002 .123 
cLatency 30331.819 2.304 13162.836 1.975 .137 .043 
Word fArea .543 1.000 .543 3.311 .076 .070 
fLatency 31836.152 1.000 31836.152 12.906 .001 .227 
cArea .128 1.000 .128 .997 .323 .022 
cLatency 38079.772 1.000 38079.772 13.359 .001 .233 
Person * 
Word 
fArea .296 2.864 .103 1.146 .332 .025 
fLatency 4656.660 2.615 1780.965 .695 .538 .016 
cArea 1.023 2.793 .366 4.019 .011 .084 
cLatency 9940.223 3.000 3313.408 1.594 .194 .035 






Table E4. Post-hoc pairwise person comparisons for ERP amplitude and latency 
Measure (I) Person (J) Person Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower CI Upper CI 
fArea Self Mother -.050 .051 .912 -.191 .091 
Fallon -.092 .043 .206 -.210 .026 
Case .189 .074 .078 -.013 .392 
Mother Self .050 .051 .912 -.091 .191 
Fallon -.042 .053 .966 -.188 .104 
Case .239 .074 .014 .034 .444 
Fallon Self .092 .043 .206 -.026 .210 
Mother .042 .053 .966 -.104 .188 
Case .281 .072 .002 .082 .481 
Case Self -.189 .074 .078 -.392 .013 
Mother -.239 .074 .014 -.444 -.034 
Fallon -.281 .072 .002 -.481 -.082 
fLatency Self Mother 1.945 6.337 1.000 -15.511 19.401 
Fallon -4.411 8.062 .995 -26.618 17.795 
Case -43.602 16.043 .055 -87.794 .589 
Mother Self -1.945 6.337 1.000 -19.401 15.511 
Fallon -6.357 6.790 .928 -25.059 12.346 
Case -45.547 16.507 .049 -91.019 -.076 
Fallon Self 4.411 8.062 .995 -17.795 26.618 
Mother 6.357 6.790 .928 -12.346 25.059 
Case -39.191 17.975 .191 -88.706 10.324 
Case Self 43.602 16.043 .055 -.589 87.794 
Mother 45.547 16.507 .049 .076 91.019 
Fallon 39.191 17.975 .191 -10.324 88.706 
cArea Self Mother -.023 .055 .999 -.173 .128 
Fallon -.034 .055 .990 -.184 .117 
Case .217 .088 .101 -.025 .460 
Mother Self .023 .055 .999 -.128 .173 
Fallon -.011 .045 1.000 -.135 .112 
Case .240 .080 .025 .021 .459 
Fallon Self .034 .055 .990 -.117 .184 
Mother .011 .045 1.000 -.112 .135 
Case .251 .074 .009 .048 .455 
Case Self -.217 .088 .101 -.460 .025 
Mother -.240 .080 .025 -.459 -.021 
Fallon -.251 .074 .009 -.455 -.048 
cLatency Self Mother -.384 8.376 1.000 -23.458 22.690 
Fallon 1.116 7.450 1.000 -19.407 21.639 
Case 21.404 12.865 .480 -14.035 56.843 
Mother Self .384 8.376 1.000 -22.690 23.458 
Fallon 1.501 8.942 1.000 -23.131 26.132 
Case 21.788 11.639 .344 -10.274 53.850 
Fallon Self -1.116 7.450 1.000 -21.639 19.407 
Mother -1.501 8.942 1.000 -26.132 23.131 
Case 20.288 13.268 .576 -16.262 56.837 
Case Self -21.404 12.865 .480 -56.843 14.035 
Mother -21.788 11.639 .344 -53.850 10.274 
Fallon -20.288 13.268 .576 -56.837 16.262 
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Table E5. Post-hoc pairwise word comparisons for ERP amplitude and latency 
Measure (I) Word (J) Word 
Mean Difference  
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.a 
95% CI for Differencea 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
fArea Character Appearance -.078 .043 .076 -.164 .008 
fLatency Character Appearance -18.808 5.235 .001 -29.359 -8.257 
cArea Character Appearance -.038 .038 .323 -.114 .038 
cLatency Character Appearance -20.570 5.628 .001 -31.912 -9.228 
Based on estimated marginal means 





Table E6. Post-hoc pairwise person*word comparisons for ERP amplitude and latency 
  Person fArea fLatency cArea cLatency 
Character 
Self Mother 0.022 9.961 0.113 10.459 
Fallon -0.033 -0.459 0.038 2.698 
Case .255* -44.727 0.232 18.077 
Mother Self -0.022 -9.961 -0.113 -10.459 
Fallon -0.054 -10.420 -0.074 -7.761 
Case 0.233 -54.688 0.120 7.618 
Fallon Self 0.033 0.459 -0.038 -2.698 
Mother 0.054 10.420 0.074 7.761 




Self -.255* 44.727 -0.232 -18.077 
Mother -0.233 54.688 -0.120 -7.618 





Mother -0.122 -6.071 -0.158 -11.227 
Fallon -0.151 -8.364 -0.106 -0.466 




Self 0.122 6.071 0.158 11.227 
Fallon -0.030 -2.293 0.052 10.762 




Self 0.151 8.364 0.106 0.466 
Mother 0.030 2.293 -0.052 -10.762 




Self -0.124 42.478 -0.203 -24.730 
Mother -.246* 36.407 -.360* -35.958* 
Fallon -.275* 34.114 -.309* -25.196 
        





95% CI for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
fArea Self Character Appearance .020 .052 .693 -.084 .125 
Mother Character Appearance -.123 .066 .069 -.256 .010 
Fallon Character Appearance -.098 .080 .229 -.260 .064 
Case Character Appearance -.110 .073 .137 -.257 .037 
fLatency Self Character Appearance -13.386 12.166 .277 -37.906 11.134 
Mother Character Appearance -29.418 9.757 .004 -49.082 -9.753 
Fallon Character Appearance -21.290 7.054 .004 -35.506 -7.075 
Case Character Appearance -11.137 10.707 .304 -32.716 10.442 
cArea Self Character Appearance .073 .050 .148 -.027 .174 
Mother Character Appearance -.197 .065 .004 -.329 -.065 
Fallon Character Appearance -.071 .079 .372 -.230 .088 
Case Character Appearance .044 .064 .495 -.084 .172 
cLatency Self Character Appearance -16.020 11.189 .159 -38.571 6.530 
Mother Character Appearance -37.707 11.042 .001 -59.961 -15.453 
Fallon Character Appearance -19.184 8.550 .030 -36.416 -1.952 
Case Character Appearance -9.367 9.142 .311 -27.792 9.058 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak. 
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Appendix F: Evoked and Induced Power Output 
Table F1. Spearman correlations for induced and evoked power 
  Frontal Centroparietal 
Induced Power  Delta Theta Alpha Beta Lowγ Highγ Delta Theta Alpha Beta Lowγ Highγ 
Frontal  Delta 1.000 .855** .710** .791** .565** .374** .827** .766** .653** .724** .297** 0.069 
Theta .855** 1.000 .828** .786** .399** .167** .800** .881** .756** .757** .185** -0.050 
Alpha .710** .828** 1.000 .831** .355** .164** .682** .760** .856** .778** .163** -0.065 
Beta .791** .786** .831** 1.000 .597** .383** .695** .704** .711** .861** .325** .098* 
LowGamma .565** .399** .355** .597** 1.000 .872** .435** .356** .314** .449** .670** .549** 
HighGamma .374** .167** .164** .383** .872** 1.000 .240** .146** .132** .246** .639** .678** 
Centroparietal Delta .827** .800** .682** .695** .435** .240** 1.000 .887** .742** .780** .356** .106* 
Theta .766** .881** .760** .704** .356** .146** .887** 1.000 .839** .783** .293** 0.043 
Alpha .653** .756** .856** .711** .314** .132** .742** .839** 1.000 .825** .251** 0.005 
Beta .724** .757** .778** .861** .449** .246** .780** .783** .825** 1.000 .420** .166** 
LowGamma .297** .185** .163** .325** .670** .639** .356** .293** .251** .420** 1.000 .891** 
HighGamma 0.069 -0.050 -0.065 .098* .549** .678** .106* 0.043 0.005 .166** .891** 1.000 
 
Evoked Power              
Frontal  Delta 1.000 .498** .127** .157** 0.050 0.024 .565** .404** .153** .150** 0.037 0.049 
Theta .498** 1.000 .488** .226** -0.038 -0.052 .408** .629** .409** .302** 0.001 0.054 
Alpha .127** .488** 1.000 .502** -0.043 -0.057 .166** .379** .710** .411** 0.018 0.033 
Beta .157** .226** .502** 1.000 0.017 -0.079 .127** .242** .408** .590** -0.016 -0.003 
LowGamma 0.050 -0.038 -0.043 0.017 1.000 .161** 0.075 0.072 0.017 -0.078 .195** -0.005 
HighGamma 0.024 -0.052 -0.057 -0.079 .161** 1.000 0.066 0.008 -0.044 -0.013 0.065 .261** 
Centroparietal Delta .565** .408** .166** .127** 0.075 0.066 1.000 .618** .255** .172** -0.001 -0.011 
Theta .404** .629** .379** .242** 0.072 0.008 .618** 1.000 .577** .342** -0.012 0.013 
Alpha .153** .409** .710** .408** 0.017 -0.044 .255** .577** 1.000 .525** -0.018 0.058 
Beta .150** .302** .411** .590** -0.078 -0.013 .172** .342** .525** 1.000 -0.074 -0.023 
LowGamma 0.037 0.001 0.018 -0.016 .195** 0.065 -0.001 -0.012 -0.018 -0.074 1.000 0.078 
HighGamma 0.049 0.054 0.033 -0.003 -0.005 .261** -0.011 0.013 0.058 -0.023 0.078 1.000 
*p < .05; **p < .001 
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Table F2. Multivariate within-subjects tests for evoked and induced power 
 
Induced Power: Within Subjects Effects Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η2 
Person Pillai's Trace .584 2.479 36.000 369.000 .000 .195 
Wilks' Lambda .505 2.586 36.000 358.236 .000 .204 
Hotelling's Trace .809 2.689 36.000 359.000 .000 .212 
Roy's Largest Root .525 5.382 12.000 123.000 .000 .344 
Word Pillai's Trace .229 .818 12.000 33.000 .631 .229 
Wilks' Lambda .771 .818 12.000 33.000 .631 .229 
Hotelling's Trace .297 .818 12.000 33.000 .631 .229 
Roy's Largest Root .297 .818 12.000 33.000 .631 .229 
Person * Word Pillai's Trace .375 1.466 36.000 369.000 .045 .125 
Wilks' Lambda .668 1.456 36.000 358.236 .048 .126 
Hotelling's Trace .435 1.445 36.000 359.000 .052 .127 
Roy's Largest Root .192 1.968 12.000 123.000 .033 .161 
 
Evoked Power: Within Subjects Effects Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η2 
Person Pillai's Trace .385 1.510 36.000 369.000 .034 .128 
Wilks' Lambda .656 1.527 36.000 358.236 .030 .131 
Hotelling's Trace .463 1.541 36.000 359.000 .028 .134 
Roy's Largest Root .254 2.603 12.000 123.000 .004 .203 
Word Pillai's Trace .168 .556 12.000 33.000 .861 .168 
Wilks' Lambda .832 .556 12.000 33.000 .861 .168 
Hotelling's Trace .202 .556 12.000 33.000 .861 .168 
Roy's Largest Root .202 .556 12.000 33.000 .861 .168 
Person * Word Pillai's Trace .341 1.314 36.000 369.000 .113 .114 
Wilks' Lambda .694 1.307 36.000 358.236 .117 .114 
Hotelling's Trace .391 1.300 36.000 359.000 .122 .115 
Roy's Largest Root .195 1.998 12.000 123.000 .030 .163 
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Person + Word + Person * Word 
b. Tests are based on averaged variables. 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 





Table F3.  Univariate within-subjects tests for induced and evoked power  
Source Induced Power Measure Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. Partial η2 
Person fDelta  13.975 2.047 6.828 3.510 .033 .074 
fTheta  5.728 2.816 2.034 1.607 .194 .035 
fAlpha  6.657 3.000 2.219 1.240 .298 .027 
fBeta  1.342 2.808 .478 .825 .476 .018 
fLowGamma  5.534 2.086 2.653 4.743 .010 .097 
fHighGamma  6.362 1.927 3.301 4.689 .013 .096 
cDelta  38.589 2.149 17.960 8.310 .000 .159 
cTheta  11.884 2.560 4.643 2.153 .107 .047 
cAlpha  1.596 2.941 .543 .303 .819 .007 
cBeta  1.711 2.436 .702 1.230 .300 .027 
cLowGamma  17.386 1.943 8.947 9.982 .000 .185 
cHighGamma  16.637 1.846 9.012 13.390 .000 .233 
Person * 
Word 
fDelta  1.821 2.888 .630 .781 .503 .017 
fTheta  4.161 2.984 1.394 1.180 .320 .026 
fAlpha  9.959 3.000 3.320 2.124 .100 .046 
fBeta  1.700 3.000 .567 1.219 .305 .027 
fLowGamma  .417 2.877 .145 .614 .601 .014 
fHighGamma  2.598 3.000 .866 4.450 .005 .092 
cDelta  5.344 2.997 1.783 1.853 .141 .040 
cTheta  1.874 3.000 .625 .568 .637 .013 
cAlpha  4.249 3.000 1.416 .921 .433 .021 
cBeta  3.788 3.000 1.263 2.065 .108 .045 
cLowGamma  1.063 2.827 .376 1.272 .287 .028 
cHighGamma  .161 2.794 .058 .240 .626 .005 
 
Source Evoked Power Measure 
 
Type III SS df Mean Square F Sig. Partial η2 
Person fDelta  7.379 2.718 2.715 2.638 0.058 0.057 
fTheta  7.790 2.881 2.704 2.177 0.096 0.047 
fAlpha  1.861 3.000 0.620 0.341 0.796 0.008 
fBeta  2.271 2.801 0.811 1.531 0.212 0.034 
fLowGamma  0.919 2.852 0.322 2.331 0.081 0.050 
fHighGamma  0.294 3.000 0.098 1.138 0.336 0.025 
cDelta  13.941 2.350 5.932 4.426    0.010   0.091 
cTheta  1.632 2.892 0.564 0.369 0.768 0.008 
cAlpha  5.359 3.000 1.786 0.979 0.405 0.022 
cBeta  2.032 2.589 0.785 1.776 0.163 0.039 
cLowGamma  0.807 3.000 0.269 1.811 0.148 0.040 
cHighGamma  0.370 3.000 0.123 1.075 0.362 0.024 







Table F4. Post-hoc person comparisons for evoked and induced power 
Induced Power 











Mother 0.170 0.029 -0.057 -0.108 .193* 0.150 0.205 -0.043 0.066 -0.109 0.001 0.099 
Fallon -0.330 -0.230 -0.017 -0.168 -0.073 -0.103 -0.221 -0.147 0.006 -0.190 0.024 -0.032 
Case 0.134 0.110 -0.335 -0.117 0.217 0.241 .666* 0.337 -0.118 -0.064 .515* .506* 
Mother 
Self -0.170 -0.029 0.057 0.108 -.193* -0.150 -0.205 0.043 -0.066 0.109 -0.001 -0.099 
Fallon -.499* -0.259 0.040 -0.059 -.266* -.253* -.427* -0.104 -0.060 -0.081 0.023 -0.131 
Case -0.035 0.081 -0.278 -0.009 0.024 0.091 0.460 0.381 -0.184 0.044 .514* .407* 
Fallon 
Self 0.330 0.230 0.017 0.168 0.073 0.103 0.221 0.147 -0.006 0.190 -0.024 0.032 
Mother .499* 0.259 -0.040 0.059 .266* .253* .427* 0.104 0.060 0.081 -0.023 0.131 




Self -0.134 -0.110 0.335 0.117 -0.217 -0.241 -.666* -0.337 0.118 0.064 -.515* -.506* 
Mother 0.035 -0.081 0.278 0.009 -0.024 -0.091 -0.460 -0.381 0.184 -0.044 -.514* -.407* 
Fallon -0.464 -0.340 0.318 -0.050 -0.290 -0.345 -.887* -0.485 0.123 -0.125 -.491* -.538* 
 
Evoked Power 











Mother -0.184 -0.096 -0.008 0.083 -0.089 -0.043 -0.194 -0.029 -0.169 0.098 0.112 -0.016 
Fallon 0.211 0.094 -0.155 0.017 0.050 0.036 0.187 -0.043 -0.208 0.078 0.027 0.037 
Case -0.063 -0.303 -0.139 -0.135 -0.036 -0.016 -0.334 -0.175 -0.342 -0.093 -0.006 -0.052 
Mother 
Self 0.184 0.096 0.008 -0.083 0.089 0.043 0.194 0.029 0.169 -0.098 -0.112 0.016 
Fallon .395* 0.190 -0.147 -0.066 0.138 0.079 .381* -0.013 -0.040 -0.020 -0.085 0.053 
Case 0.121 -0.207 -0.131 -0.219 0.052 0.027 -0.140 -0.146 -0.173 -0.191 -0.119 -0.036 
Fallon 
Self -0.211 -0.094 0.155 -0.017 -0.050 -0.036 -0.187 0.043 0.208 -0.078 -0.027 -0.037 
Mother -.395* -0.190 0.147 0.066 -0.138 -0.079 -.381* 0.013 0.040 0.020 0.085 -0.053 




Self 0.063 0.303 0.139 0.135 0.036 0.016 0.334 0.175 0.342 0.093 0.006 0.052 
Mother -0.121 0.207 0.131 0.219 -0.052 -0.027 0.140 0.146 0.173 0.191 0.119 0.036 
Fallon 0.274 0.397 -0.016 0.152 0.086 0.052 0.521 0.133 0.133 0.171 0.033 0.089 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak. 
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Table F5. Post-hoc pairwise person*word comparisons for induced power 
   Frontal  Centroparietal 











Character  Self  Mother 0.260 0.017 0.336 0.026 0.259 .289*  0.296 -0.122 0.371 -0.157 0.016 0.094 
Fallon -0.171 -0.351 -0.022 -0.003 0.019 0.102  0.077 -0.034 0.123 -0.067 0.143 0.009 
Case 0.117 -0.158 -0.296 -0.085 0.255 0.260  .924* 0.297 0.034 -0.228 .494* .492* 
Mother  Self -0.260 -0.017 -0.336 -0.026 -0.259 -.289*  -0.296 0.122 -0.371 0.157 -0.016 -0.094 
Fallon -0.431 -0.368 -0.359 -0.029 -0.241 -0.187  -0.219 0.089 -0.247 0.090 0.128 -0.085 
Case -0.143 -0.175 -0.633 -0.112 -0.004 -0.029  0.629 0.420 -0.337 -0.071 .478* 0.399 
Fallon  Self 0.171 0.351 0.022 0.003 -0.019 -0.102  -0.077 0.034 -0.123 0.067 -0.143 -0.009 
Mother 0.431 0.368 0.359 0.029 0.241 0.187  0.219 -0.089 0.247 -0.090 -0.128 0.085 
Case 0.288 0.194 -0.274 -0.083 0.236 0.158  .847* 0.331 -0.090 -0.161 0.350 .483* 
Case 
 
Self -0.117 0.158 0.296 0.085 -0.255 -0.260  -.924* -0.297 -0.034 0.228 -.494* -.492* 
Mother 0.143 0.175 0.633 0.112 0.004 0.029  -0.629 -0.420 0.337 0.071 -.478* -0.399 
Fallon -0.288 -0.194 0.274 0.083 -0.236 -0.158  -.847* -0.331 0.090 0.161 -0.350 -.483* 
Appearance  Self  Mother 0.079 0.041 -0.450 -0.243 0.128 0.011  0.115 0.036 -0.238 -0.060 -0.014 0.105 
Fallon -0.488 -0.108 -0.012 -0.332 -0.165 -.309*  -.520* -0.261 -0.112 -0.312 -0.096 -0.073 
Case 0.151 0.377 -0.374 -0.149 0.180 0.222  0.407 0.378 -0.269 0.099 .537* .520* 
Mother  Self -0.079 -0.041 0.450 0.243 -0.128 -0.011  -0.115 -0.036 0.238 0.060 0.014 -0.105 
Fallon -.568* -0.149 0.438 -0.090 -.292* -.319*  -.635* -0.297 0.126 -0.252 -0.082 -0.178 
Case 0.072 0.336 0.076 0.094 0.052 0.212  0.292 0.342 -0.031 0.159 .550* .415* 
Fallon  Self 0.488 0.108 0.012 0.332 0.165 .309*  .520* 0.261 0.112 0.312 0.096 0.073 
Mother .568* 0.149 -0.438 0.090 .292* .319*  .635* 0.297 -0.126 0.252 0.082 0.178 
Case 0.640 0.486 -0.362 0.184 0.345 .531*  .927* 0.639 -0.157 0.411 .633* .593* 
Case 
 
Self -0.151 -0.377 0.374 0.149 -0.180 -0.222  -0.407 -0.378 0.269 -0.099 -.537* -.520* 
Mother -0.072 -0.336 -0.076 -0.094 -0.052 -0.212  -0.292 -0.342 0.031 -0.159 -.550* -.415* 
Fallon -0.640 -0.486 0.362 -0.184 -0.345 -.531*  -.927* -0.639 0.157 -0.411 -.633* -.593* 
               
Self                Character-Appearance -0.005 -0.214 0.027 0.142 0.017 0.115  0.115 -0.197 0.093 -0.045 0.037 -0.054 
Mother           Character-Appearance -0.186 -0.190 -.760* -0.127 -0.114 -.164*  -0.065 -0.039 -.516* 0.052 0.008 -0.043 
Fallon             Character-Appearance -0.322 0.029 0.037 -0.188 -0.166 -.296*  -.482* -0.425 -0.143 -0.290 -0.202 -0.137 
Case               Character-Appearance 0.029 0.321 -0.051 0.079 -0.057 0.077  -0.403 -0.117 -0.210 0.282 0.080 -0.027 
Values are differences (I-J) between estimated marginal means. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 




Figure F1. Evoked and induced power (µV2) by person, word, and region 




Appendix G: Source Analysis Output 
 




Figure G2. Leadfield alignment with the standard BEM head model 
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Appendix H: HSMM-MVPA Output 
Table H1. Pairwise comparisons of stage durations for all subjects in 3-bump HSMM-MVPA 
models of self, mother, and Fallon for character and appearance 
Character      
Stage (I) Person (J) Person Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
1 Self Mother -8.44 4.82 .238 
Fallon 99.98* 6.53 .000 
Mother Self 8.44 4.82 .238 
Fallon 108.42* 7.77 .000 
2 Self Mother 5.29* 1.59 .005 
Fallon -74.68* 4.08 .000 
Mother Self -5.29* 1.59 .005 
Fallon -79.97* 4.26 .000 
3 Self Mother 11.63* 3.87 .013 
Fallon -2.59 3.64 .859 
Mother Self -11.63* 3.87 .013 
Fallon -14.22* 4.78 .014 
4 Self Mother -8.48 3.83 .093 
Fallon -22.71* 3.79 .000 
Mother Self 8.48 3.83 .093 
Fallon -14.23* 5.07 .022 
Appearance      
Stage (I) Person (J) Person Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
1 Self Mother -6.381 4.269 .369 
Fallon 106.149 6.444 .000 
Mother Self 6.381 4.269 .369 
Fallon 112.530 6.736 .000 
2 Self Mother -.114 2.102 1.000 
Fallon -79.730 4.145 .000 
Mother Self .114 2.102 1.000 
Fallon -79.616 4.503 .000 
3 Self Mother 4.691 3.216 .390 
Fallon -4.351 3.162 .440 
Mother Self -4.691 3.216 .390 
Fallon -9.042 3.605 .047 
4 Self Mother 1.804 4.226 .965 
Fallon -22.068 3.600 .000 
Mother Self -1.804 4.226 .965 
Fallon -23.872 4.904 .000 





Table H2. Pairwise comparisons of bump magnitudes for all subjects in 3-bump HSMM-MVPA 
models of self, mother, and Fallon collapsed across character and appearance 
Bump (I) Person (J) Person Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.b 
1 Self Mother .093* .001 .000 
Fallon .266* .001 .000 
Mother Self -.093* .001 .000 
Fallon .173* .001 .000 
Fallon Self -.266* .001 .000 
Mother -.173* .001 .000 
2 Self Mother .040* .001 .000 
Fallon .098* .001 .000 
Mother Self -.040* .001 .000 
Fallon .058* .001 .000 
Fallon Self -.098* .001 .000 
Mother -.058* .001 .000 
3 Self Mother -.027* .000 .000 
Fallon -.195* .001 .000 
Mother Self .027* .000 .000 
Fallon -.168* .001 .000 
Fallon Self .195* .001 .000 
Mother .168* .001 .000 




Figure H1. Topoplots of averaged ERP data from the self-character condition from 0 to 1.5 
seconds using Fieldtrip. All other conditions showed similar topographies but on slightly 








































Figure H2. Topographies of self, mother, and Fallon for 4 and 5-bump HSMM-MVPA models. 
Like the 3-bump model, these model has considerable similarity to the topoplots in Figure H1. 
5-Bump Model 
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